

THE WIRETAPPERS

December 23, 1952 25c

The Reporter

UNIVERSITY
MICHIGAN
COLLEGE
READERS' BOOK



His Honor in doubt: William O'Dwyer looking over wiretapping equipment that might have leaked some dirt out of New York's City Hall (see page 22)



THE REPORTER'S NOTES

The New Cabinet

Most of the men whom General Eisenhower has appointed to head the major departments of our government come, as was to be expected, from business, and indeed from big business. There is nothing shocking in this fact, for business is unquestionably the one prevailing vocation in our country that sets the standards for all others and keeps them going. There is no reason on earth why, of all people, the most successful businessmen should be excluded or exempted from assuming the direct responsibility of running the government.

In fact, there has never been a time when men from big business have not been called to Washington and entrusted with positions of great authority. This was true even in the heyday of the New Deal, when Harry Hopkins was particularly successful in surrounding himself with émigrés from big business; it became even truer, of course, during the war, when eminent businessmen, who had not acquired any distaste for their calling, became top bureaucrats for the duration.

It's a matter of record that a few of them went from their high government positions straight into oblivion. Let them stay there. Some others, like William Kundsen, the immediate predecessor of Charles E. Wilson as president of General Motors, did creditable but not over-brilliant jobs. Some others, like James Forrestal and Robert Lovett, turned into admirable public servants. Strangely enough, it can be said that Wall Street, and particularly the great investment houses, provided men who were more capable of mastering governmental organization than those from industry. Somehow, salesmen did a better job as administrative leaders than manufacturers.

The most successful of the salesmen, of course, was Paul Hoffman, who graduated into a statesman. Incidentally, it is regrettable that this man who did so much for Eisenhower's candidacy is not to be found in the Eisenhower Cabinet. Perhaps those who advised the General on his Cabinet appointments may have had Paul Hoffman in the backs of their minds, for in the Cabinet there are three men from the automobile industry: the commander-in-chief of General Motors, Charles Wilson; and two of its best salesmen, Arthur Summerfield and Douglas McKay. Somebody may even have thought that, since General Motors is so much bigger than Studebaker, General Motors was the place to look for bigger and better Hoffmans.

SOMEHOW, we think it would be difficult to find another Hoffman, particularly in General Motors. For, aside from his rare personal qualities, Paul Hoffman became the well-rounded kind of man he is because he worked his way up to chief salesman of a middle-sized business. He knows what it takes to compete with the mammoth producers. He also knows the price of economic freedom.

Mammoth corporations are private governments, and may easily fall victim to what Justice Brandeis called "the curse of bigness." They certainly are not exempt from the curse of bureaucracy. The national government is quite a different thing. It has to deal with people and with institutions, not with those lucrative abstractions that are called consumers and producers. The leaders of private government can easily bring under control—and sometimes eliminate—the troubles of competition. But our national government is now up against an extremely tough competitor: Soviet Russia.

Yet once again, there are no reasons why men from big business shouldn't

have their chance to learn how to run the nation. Indeed, the Eisenhower Cabinet looks like an adult-education class. We sincerely hope that its members will learn fast.

Where Bipartisanship Works

After so much shouting about corruption during the campaign, the time has come, we think, to see what the new Administration can do about it. Corruption in government is an immensely complex affair. It cannot be dealt with in any one clean sweep of investigation and legislation.

One thing, however, is certain: Wherever corruption pays off, it is bipartisan. No connection-peddler will ever limit the range of his friendships only to men who have a real or alleged influence on the party in power. That is not good enough insurance, and if the favor-seeker knows his business, he invariably seeks bipartisan counter-insurance. Bipartisanship, which has been lamentably lacking of late in the conduct of foreign affairs, never fails to work when it comes to shady deals. Is there any alert five per cent operator in Washington who does not cultivate friends among Republicans and Democrats alike?

To paraphrase Mr. Dooley, no matter whether the Constitution follows the flag or not, the pressure of influence-peddlers follows the election returns. It is bound to weigh more heavily now—although never exclusively—on the party that has just climbed into power.

As the leader of the Republican Party, the General will have to keep a very close watch on the men whom he or the voters have put in positions of authority. The General certainly knows, we assume, that every change in Administration is likely to throw a few rascals out and to attract some rascals in.

Just because corruption is bipartisan, the clean-out must be a bipartisan and

LOYALTY OATH

(The Board of Education of Harrison, New York, recently ordered that officers and guest speakers of any organization wishing to use school facilities must sign a loyalty oath.)

Two oaths there are which bear comparison:

One, "I am loyal," the other, "I betrayed."

The first was made in nearby Harrison,

The other in Prague; and both by men afraid.

nonpartisan job—an entirely merciless one. It must be done by men who live up to the most exacting standards of integrity, men who are to be found in both parties and in no party.

The General will come to realize, we are sure, that neither a broom nor DDT can do it. The job requires bulldozers and men who use them fearlessly, even when the foundations of a house where a friend may live are to be destroyed.

It Had to Happen

Once more, evil men in search of scapegoats have found their easiest and most profitable outlet in anti-Semitism, as the trials in the satellite countries of eastern Europe prove. Probably it was only because of Hitler that the Communists waited so long before finding out that their troubles come from the Jews—together, of course, with cosmopolitan intellectuals, lackeys of Wall Street, warmongers, social democrats, and the like. But sooner or later these master haters had to put the Jews—those favorite targets of all haters—on their list.

There are quite a few professional haters in our country, men who have made it their business to incite Americans against other Americans who happen to be Jews or Catholics or Negroes. We would like to ask these professionals of evil: How do you like your new company? Really, you should not be too finicky, for you can be sure that the men in the Kremlin do not mind yours.

The Missing Diplomats

A recent debate in the British House of Lords—and the manner in which a London paper reported it—shows how British procedure differs from our own when it comes to dealing with

men suspected of Communism but against whom no proof of Communism has been established. Their Lordships were considering the missing diplomats, Messrs. Maclean and Burgess, whose story Cyril Connolly concludes in this issue of *The Reporter*.

In the first place, the lead of the newspaper's Parliamentary report refers to the missing men only as persons who had "absented themselves without leave from their duties in the Foreign Office last year"—an accurate description and nothing more.

Secondly, in the course of the debate, Lord Elton, who previously had charged that Maclean had made a recording in which he had described himself as a "proselytising Communist," apologized to the House. Lord Elton said: "I am more than sorry to think that this additional and baseless charge [it had been shown to be "wholly erroneous and untrue"] must have caused unnecessary pain to the relations and friends of Mr. Maclean." In this country our crusaders have not accustomed us either to such forthright retractions or to the idea that men accused of Communism may have relations and friends.

Finally, a lighter note came into the

case—on the matter of heavy drinking by public officials. With calm assurance, the London *Sunday Times* editorially dared to make the following remark: "He [Maclean] began to be known as a heavy drinker in America, but if that alone were a disqualification for public life our history in several phases would have been the poorer."

Sterilized Advertising

Not long ago, the *Journal of the American Medical Association* rejected an advertisement in which the *Atlantic Monthly* sought to call attention to an article written by Dr. James Howard Means dealing with national health problems. The *New York Times* got hold of Thomas R. Gardiner, business manager of the medical periodical, and Mr. Gardiner explained his refusal of the ad on the grounds that it was "unsuitable" and that he understood that there were some untruths in it.

The *Journal's* devotion to meticulous accuracy in its advertising matter is praiseworthy. But it is a standard that we wish the medical lobby would apply with equal care to its semantics in labeling all national health programs "socialistic."

BRITISH TELEVISION TO ACCEPT COMMERCIALS

(Some day)

Oh Pelion on Ossa,
Oh hordes of Barbarossa,
The BBC is letting down its bars!
When you turn the damn thing on, sir,
You'll have some bl--dy sponsor
Imploring you to buy his bl--dy cars.

And jingle upon jingle
Will sourly intermingle
With madrigals and garden notes and ballet,
And some appalling fellow
Will chatter about Jello
And giggle at his idiotic sally.

Oh horror piled on horror,
Oh Sodom and Gomorrah—
(That's us)—there is no end to Britain's ills—
In future she must swallow
The fact that what may follow
Macbeth is Carter's Little Liver Pills!

—SEC

CORRESPONDENCE

THE FORGOTTEN MAN

To the Editor: One of the major issues in the recent Presidential campaign was that of foreign policy. In all the millions of words spoken by the Democrats in defense of that policy, it was curious and deplorable—though perhaps understandable—that the name of Dean Acheson was hardly mentioned. Probably the answer lies in the fact that the State Department and the so-called "Acheson-Jessup combine" received such a drubbing at the hands of McCarthy that it was deemed politically inexpedient to speak of them by name, although their policies were widely defended.

Twenty-six million Americans wanted Governor Stevenson as our next President and presumably therefore supported in large measure the Administration's foreign policy. As one of those twenty-six million I feel impelled to state my belief that Dean Acheson will go down in history as one of the greatest Secretaries of State this country has ever had. He and his closest associates who will retire in January are owed an immense debt of gratitude by the American people for the tremendous work they have done in the face of intense opposition and bitter criticism.

MARTHA B. WALCOTT
Englewood, New Jersey

To the Editor: In your November 25 edition Max Ascoli notes how great a debt is owed to Dean Acheson—probably the most reviled man in the memory of most people. I heartily subscribe to this view.

CHARLES R. AYER
Framingham, Massachusetts

THE U.N. IN L.A.

To the Editor: In the November 11 issue of *The Reporter* there appears an article by Mark A. Hennessey ("Saving Los Angeles From the U.N.") which purports to be an account of the recent controversy in Los Angeles over the teaching of UNESCO material in the public schools. Spiritual Mobilization is mentioned briefly in the article as one of the connections of one of the participants in the school affair. This organization itself took no part in the affair one way or the other.

It is as false as it is absurd to say, as Mr. Hennessey does, that "the basic philosophy of Spiritual Mobilization . . . is this: 'I am only what is mine; I am the sum of the material things I possess and control.'" He uses this quotation in his article as if it were a published statement of this organization, representing its position. There is no such statement in our literature, nor anything remotely resembling such a statement.

On the contrary, the organization's basic

philosophy is summed up in the seventeen-year-old creed: "Man, being created free as a child of God, has certain inalienable rights and responsibilities; the State must not be permitted to usurp them: It is the duty of the church to help protect them." This is "dialectical materialism"? Oh, Mr. Hennessey!

The flattering assertion that Dr. Fifield or Spiritual Mobilization got a \$50,000 check after he addressed a National Association of Manufacturers meeting in 1944 has been repeatedly denied by Dr. Fifield.

JAMES C. INGBRETSSEN
Vice-President and Counsel
Spiritual Mobilization
Los Angeles

To the Editor: Thanks very much for sending me the tear sheets from *The Reporter* entitled "Saving Los Angeles From the U.N." I think Mr. Hennessey did a good job. His analysis of the situation is far more accurate than many others that have been made. He did not tell the whole story but he did catch many of the facts and their significance.

ALEXANDER J. STODDARD
Superintendent of Schools
Los Angeles

BLURRING A PRINCIPLE

To the Editor: The Republicans will soon be in power, and some of them may be tempted to emulate the financial arrangements of our future Vice-President. It would be unfortunate if their behavior in office were to be based on the double error that they supported so strenuously during the campaign—to wit, that questions of morality can be settled by majority vote; and that the principle of the Nixon fund has bipartisan support, as evidenced by the existence of the Stevenson fund.

Now the Republicans have been at great pains to prove that Stevenson's fund was identical in principle with Nixon's, that the possibility of influence on and by the Governor himself existed, even though he was careful to prevent any direct influence of donors or beneficiaries.

The Stevenson fund's purpose was to reduce the possibility of private influence on public servants by helping these officials to perform their public duties under less financial pressure. The Nixon fund would have continued, but for the campaign publicity, as long as the Senator continued to serve the purposes of its contributors. Its purpose was to enable a public servant, not to serve the people better, but to undertake activities ("to do a selling job to the American people") beyond those which he was elected, and paid, to perform. Its effect was to blur the principle that legislators should main-

tain their independence of private influence so that they may be free to serve all the people. It set a precedent—that you may accept a bribe provided you are already in sympathy with the purpose for which it is offered.

DOROTHEA FULKERSON
Levittown, New York

ASSIGNMENT ACCEPTED

To the Editor: Like *The Reporter*, I, too, thought that Adlai Stevenson was the man for the job. Our fellow citizens having signed us to the role of "loyal opposition," we must share the task of helping General Eisenhower fit himself for that job.

I hope *The Reporter* will become the friendly critic of the new Administration, as it was of the last. For the present, though, I would like to see *The Reporter* perform a serious and searching autopsy on the election returns. I will be looking for answers to these seemingly obvious questions:

Who won the election? Was it Eisenhower the celebrated personality? Or Eisenhower the reputed liberal of his party? Or the candidate who was simply not Truman? Was the campaign superfluous? Or was it a merchandising triumph for the good, well-advertised product over the good, unknown product?

Is the South really split? Which aspect of the returns is more important: that Eisenhower won several Southern states, or that Stevenson's only electoral votes came from there?

Are the voters cool toward the Republican Party because they expressed a greater liking for Ike than for his "team"? Or does it take supreme magnanimity to return McCarthy, Jenner, Watkins, et al., and reflect basic confidence in the party? After all, if Roosevelt couldn't "purge," should Eisenhower be able to elect?

What was the role of women in the election? Did they have a crush on Ike, and to hell with politics? And what happened to the "labor family," and others? Did we vote as a nation on November 4, regardless of occupational, regional, racial, and social boundaries?

Well, this should keep you busy until my three-year subscription runs out.

WILLIAM D. ORR
Palo Alto, California

(We accept Mr. Orr's assignment with enthusiasm. Douglass Cater has made a beginning on the South in this issue, and what happened to the "labor family" was discussed by Warner Bloomberg, Jr., in an article entitled "How They Took the Bad News in Gary, Indiana," which appeared in our issue of December 9.—THE EDITORS.)

The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

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William S. Fairfield and Charles Clift


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WHO—WHAT—WHY—

FROM time to time we like to go all out on a story. The same kind of job we did on our China Lobby series we have now done on another subject that has not been properly reported. *The Reporter* now estimates the extent to which the vice of wiretapping has permeated our society.

The investigation was originally suggested by Charles Clift, a member of our staff. William S. Fairfield, who less than four years after his graduation from Harvard has become a regular and versatile contributor to these pages, was selected to work along with Mr. Clift and write the text, and the two started to work last May.

STALIN has alarmed the world with a paradox: In the now-famous article he published to enlighten the recent Communist Congress, he maintained that while the Communist empire can coexist peacefully with the democratic nations, the democratic nations cannot coexist peacefully among themselves. What are we to make of this new version of "historical inevitability"? It is a tangled story—in this case a story told obscurely in the difficult jargon of Communist pronouncements. An exceptionally qualified interpreter is Isaac Deutscher, who, born in Poland, knew the party from the inside. Out of that knowledge, and also out of his rejection of Stalinism, he wrote his monumental *Stalin: A Political Biography*. Mr. Deutscher lives in London.

WITH Cyril Connolly's second and concluding article on the two missing British diplomats, the case rests. Mr. Connolly, founder and editor of the now-defunct *Horizon* (he got tired of running it), is the brilliant author of *The Rock Pool*, *Enemies of Promise*, *The Unquiet Grave*, and *The Condemned Playground*.

A MAN who is in the true sense of the word an idealist and never a sentimentalist, A. A. Berle, Jr., discusses the present position of the United Nations with characteristic hardheadedness. Mr. Berle's remarkable public career started when as a young man he served with the American Delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference which ended the First World War. Professor of Corporation Law at Columbia Law School since 1927, he served as Assistant Secretary of State from 1938 to 1944. In 1945 he went to Brazil as Ambassador. Mr. Berle is Chairman of the Liberal Party of New York State. His book *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (1924, revised 1932) is already a classic. His most recent work is *Natural Selection of Political Forces*. Forthcoming will be a study of the

relationship between the modern corporation and the state.

THERE has been a great deal of talk about the birth of a two-party system in the South. For a report on the unusual infant, we sent a Southerner back home. Douglas Cater joined *The Reporter* shortly after his graduation from Harvard.

THIS is primarily a political magazine, and yet anything that affects our thinking and our habits as much as the movies do is bound to be within our editorial interest. Indeed, we are anxious to increase our coverage of the arts and entertainment. In this issue we are happy to present an evaluation of Alec Guinness. Lesley Blanch was an editor on the British *Vogue* and contributes regularly to the *Cornhill Magazine*.

QUITE a few readers in their letters to the Editor have been asking a question that the Editor is uniquely qualified to answer: "Who is Max Ascoli?" To satisfy this entirely legitimate curiosity, the Editor for once will write in the first person singular.

I landed in the United States as a political immigrant from Fascist Italy on the fifth of October, 1931. In my native country, where I had spent the first thirty-two years of my life, I had been a writer, a university professor of jurisprudence, and, above all, from the beginning of Fascism, an anti-Fascist. I was a very young man without any political affiliation when the Fascist movement started and, in October, 1922, gained control of the country. The Fascist revolution struck me as a pathological degeneracy of democracy likely to ruin other nations besides Italy. In the days of the March on Rome I wrote that Fascism was democracy gone blind; after I had become an American writer, in *Fascism for Whom?* (Norton, 1938) I called it "democracy without freedom."

This obsessive concern with freedom made me an anti-Fascist from early youth and a tireless analyst of democracy throughout my life, constantly engaged in searching for the point at which democratic institutions fail to work in strengthening freedom. In all my writings and teaching I am afraid there has been a consistency which shows the hopeless limitations of my mind.

From 1928 until I left Italy, I was in the clutches of the police. I spent several weeks in jail, a few months under a sort of house arrest and, whenever I was "free," I had at least one detective at my heels.

I could never, of course, have left Italy had it not been for a fellowship I received from the Rockefeller Foundation, whose representative in Italy was Luigi Einaudi, now

President of the Italian Republic. For two years I traveled throughout the United States and worked at Harvard, at the University of Chicago, and at the University of Wisconsin. It has been one of my pet theories for years that the destiny of every foreigner who comes here is decided the very day he lands: Either he takes to America or he doesn't. In an article that I wrote for the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1939, when I became a citizen, I said: "Americans are born, not made," for there are people who—no matter where they were born—can fully find themselves only when they come over here. At least this has been my case.

In 1933, I was appointed Professor of Political Philosophy on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York. It was then called the University in Exile, as all its members were refugee German scholars, with one lonely Italian—me—in their midst.

From then on, besides teaching, I did a lot of writing (the *Atlantic*, *Foreign Affairs*, the *Annals of Social Science*, the *Yale Review*, etc.,) and in 1936 I published a book, *Intelligence in Politics* (Norton). Most of my writing was on my pet obsession: how, in the democratic climate of our times, freedom can perish. My first article on an American domestic controversy appeared in the *Herald Tribune* in 1937: It was a criticism of F.D.R.'s attempt to "pack" the Supreme Court.

In 1940 I became president of the Mazzini Society, the main organization of Italo-American and Italian anti-Fascists. Before Pearl Harbor I went to work for the government on Latin-American affairs, my main stock in trade being that I was a Latin by birth and education and an American by citizenship and loyalty.

At the end of 1944 I set up a foundation to help the Italian handicraft producers and the promotion of their products in this country. I thought that not even Mussolini and the Germans could destroy the skill which is in the hands of the Italian artisans. This little pre-ECA project did good work.

But with my single-track mind, even when I was spending a great deal of energy on Italian handicrafts and teaching, I couldn't help writing about freedom—how it is generated, how it can be lost. *The Power of Freedom* was published in 1948. It contains some of the main ideas which, tested against the concrete situations of our day, are to be found in *The Reporter*.

October 5, I guess, is the lucky day of my life. On October 5 I first landed in America; nine years later to the day I married Marion Rosenwald, daughter of Julius Rosenwald. In 1942, Pete was born. I am just as proud of Pete as of *The Reporter*.

The Reporter in 1953

WE do it again: A publication like *The Reporter* must periodically take its bearings, redefine its stand, and chart the course ahead. A candid accounting to our readers is particularly in order since we have just come through a rather stormy time during the past campaign, which we entered flying the Eisenhower colors and came out of on the losing side. We can now state our position and purposes, not in terms of generalities, but in the context of the situation created by the last election.

WE are not, we think, indulging in partisan recrimination when we say that the Republican victory constitutes the major obstacle facing the Eisenhower Administration. This comes not because of the size of the victory but because of the means the Republican leaders used to gain it. It is still extraordinarily difficult to understand why such means were chosen, why the General decided to wage his campaign as a hell-for-leather Indian fighter rather than as the soldier-statesman he had been and—so we pray—will be again. A formidable barrage with all the media of popular stultification was thought to be necessary to bring about the Eisenhower Presidency which an overwhelming number of Americans had wanted for years.

On the Democratic side, Stevenson proved how far-reaching could be the appeal of the sober, sensible approach so many had expected from Eisenhower for, in spite of all odds, Stevenson gained the confidence of 26 million voters. It was as though some horrid trick of magic all through the campaign made the Stevenson speeches sound like the disembodied voice of his opponent, while, on the other hand, there was enough left of Eisenhower's physical radiance and massiveness to make it impossible for the majority of the people to vote him down. All in all, for too many Americans, this campaign was a nightmarish ordeal of soul-searching and bewilderment. Nobody can say at present why such a messy Caesarean was thought preferable to an eagerly expected, joyous birth.

This question, however, must be answered within the next four years. The answer requires a good

memory and a good capacity for analysis—we would like to say for thorough rumination. It requires also charity and humility, for who, during the campaign, wasn't surprised and shocked by the emotions and fears mounting in himself?

Yet the ruminating job has to be done. It is as important as the one of looking at what lies ahead of our nation irrespective of the Administration in power. We think that *The Reporter* can at least make a good start at both. It would be just as absurd and irresponsible to forget what happened during the election as continually to confront the leaders of the new Administration with some of the outlandish statements they made during the campaign. The less inclined these leaders are to use a meat ax in the necessary job of economizing, the less willing they are to let Asians fight Asians, or Africans fight Africans, the more grateful to them we will be. Our goal is to grasp the nature of the conflict that has ravaged our nation, and to do our best so that it may be brought within the bounds of responsible, constructive debate. *The Reporter* is written for people who feel this need and who, no matter how they voted in the end, fought their way through the election in anguish because they could not figure out what was happening to the country—and to themselves.

This time, the national unity, the internal peace which the interest of the country demands, cannot be taken for granted as something that automatically happens as soon as the shouting is over and the returns are in. We must get the poison of the election out of our system—but above all we must start by recognizing that there is such a poison in our system and that this has not been just another Presidential campaign. For, among other reasons, never was our nation so unmistakably the primary target of a merciless enemy and never were the other peoples of the world so vitally involved in the outcome of an internal American contest. Perhaps what was most wrong in the last campaign is that it was considered, particularly by the Republicans, a purely domestic affair. The party that won fought the election at the municipal, or rather at

the ward, level, while the leader of the losing party always spoke to the whole nation and gained the confidence of the free peoples of the world. No wonder there is so much apprehension still, at home and abroad.

Ruminate We Must

The Reporter is ready to do its best to dispel apprehensions and fears, but it cannot deny their existence. *The Reporter* will keep a constant watch on some particular key spots: How, for instance, will our new diplomacy act on the system of alliances that surrounds America, and how will the system of alliances react to our new diplomacy? For no American Administration, no matter what its party label, can save American freedom unless it does its utmost to develop and strengthen a belt of supranational commonwealths around our country.

And we cannot, of course, forget certain very strategic areas at home: the pressure for massive conformity and for systematic obfuscation of issues that proved so slick and so irresistible during the Republican campaign. This demands a constant watch on the mass media of communication that *The Reporter* will try to the best of its ability to keep.

A particularly close scrutiny has to be exerted on television, for it is not clear yet what our politicians are going to do to us now that they break into our houses on our television screens. No one so far—not even Stevenson—has succeeded in making of television a medium of man-to-man, heart-to-heart communication with the people, as Roosevelt did with radio. Certainly it was while looking at television that many of us suffered our most shattering campaign traumas: on that afternoon, for instance, when the pouring rain in Abilene seemed to wash out so many of our hopes, or on that night—a far more distasteful episode to remember—when the man who, for the next four years, will be heir presumptive to the Presidency, imposed on us his own kind of intimacy.

For all these jobs of watching, looking ahead, and explaining, *The Reporter* is prepared. We have gained quite a number of friends who, because of what we have done, have confidence in what we are doing. They know that we are not addicted to nursing old grudges; above all they know that when we criticize or denounce policies we consider wrong we always try to suggest what, in our opinion, would be right.

From time to time, we like to pick up a big problem that for some reason other publications are inclined to overlook: the China Lobby, for in-

stance, or wiretapping. We like to concentrate on what really matters; from the start we gave up any pretense at offering in every issue a chatty report on what had occurred in the past fortnight in every corner of the globe, but our readers know that we try to cover everything that is important—no matter whether it makes news or not—and to discuss it as thoroughly and constructively as we can.

What moves us is a militant faith in freedom and in America. We consider them interchangeable, and we think that this faith can be made much more contagious when attested by one's work rather than by flag waving. Actually, we care too deeply for freedom and for America to be flag wavers of "liberalism" or of "Americanism."

Because of our training, our faith, and our fundamental optimism, we like to think that we are somewhat equipped to follow constructively and critically the course of the Republican Administration. We certainly have no preconceived hostility toward President Eisenhower, for we do not forget that we were among the very first to advocate his candidacy. We do not want to spend the next four years ruminating over the memorable episodes of his campaign—although until his achievements prove to us that we can stop, ruminate we must.

The Reporter's Business

We think it is not inappropriate at this time to offer our readers further information about this magazine. During the past year the circulation of *The Reporter* has taken quite a spurt. It was 23,000 last January; at the moment of this writing, it is up to 80,000, and it is climbing fast. Unquestionably, *The Reporter* has proved that it answers the demands of an ever-increasing number of readers. It still has a long way to go and, of course, the greater and faster its growth, the better it will become.

When a publication shows such vitality, it is no longer the exclusive concern of the people who work on it. Our readers, we suppose, know the facts of publishing life; they know that advertising brings revenue to publications according to the range of their readership and capacity for growth. This fact imposes some rather heavy rules on the publishing game—rules that we accepted when we went into this business.

This is not only ours but our readers' venture. As the result of the election we are faced with added responsibilities. Will our readers do what is in their power to make all the people they know aware of their magazine?

The Wiretappers

WILLIAM S. FAIRFIELD and CHARLES CLIFT

I. Who's Listening —And to What?

WIRETAPPING, a furtive practice that recognizes no legal bounds, has become the uninvited, unsuspected third party to the private telephone conversations carried on by American citizens of all persuasions and beliefs from all walks of life.

In 1934 Congress passed a law providing severe penalties for wiretapping, but only one person has ever been prosecuted and convicted under it, and that was eleven years ago. Wiretapping today is actually the freest of free enterprises, highly expensive, but indulged in with virtual immunity from Federal prosecution by government agents, municipal police, political parties, business firms, witch hunters, divorce lawyers, private detectives, sharpers, freebooters, and blackmailers of all sorts—all of whom practice it in the serene conviction that there will never be any penalties.

This boldness stems from the knowledge that the Department of Justice is reluctant to press wiretapping cases to prosecution or even to gather evidence for them. Admittedly sensitive about the legality of tapping by its own agents, the Department of Justice hesitates to risk legal action that might focus attention on its own "extralegal" practices.

AS A RESULT of this lack of restriction, wiretapping is now a common practice in almost every troubled area of American life. Anywhere in this country anyone with a telephone who fits any of the following categories is fair game for wiretapping, most likely

for the specified purposes: a rich man for blackmail; a businessman for competitive information; a union leader for labor espionage; a politician for future attacks by opponents; a public administrator for advance tips on pending decisions; a philanderer for a favorable divorce settlement; a criminal for arrest and prosecution; a Communist or suspected Communist for a security check; a simple nonconformist for compilation of a dossier of his unpopular views; a member of the armed forces or a government employee for a check on personal associations and loose talk; any private employee for testing his efficiency and loyalty to the firm; a

taxpayer for information on possible evasions.

This, although it is quite a list, seemingly eliminates a good many Americans who don't belong in any of these categories. But so far as the treasured right to individual privacy is concerned, it eliminates none. For a wiretapper eavesdrops indiscriminately. He catches in his net, together with the intended victim, all those who happen to use or to call a telephone being tapped, however irrelevant the call to the purpose of the tapper. And with police today monitoring many public pay-station phones in search of gamblers or prostitutes, the most innocent




may find their private and sometimes very personal conversations recorded side by side with the business calls of a booker or a procurer.

The result is that many an unwary talker has thus provided enough information on his private affairs and troubles to make him prey to an unscrupulous listener. When police or government agents are doing the listening, any words that come over a phone, whether or not germane to the matter being investigated, become *ipso facto* evidence for incrimination or guilt. The words could be those of a real criminal, of course, and then again they could be those of the Red Cross canvassing for new contributors—and there are listeners to whom even the Red Cross might be suspect.

In connection with the statement that anyone with a telephone is fair game for a tapper, it should be pointed out that if a line is considered worth tapping, and if someone has the money (or the staff) in addition to the inclination, he can have a tap installed on that line within twenty-four hours, no matter where in the United States it is located, no matter what the private or official capacities of its users. And once the tap is installed, the chances against accidentally discovering it would be at least ten thousand to one.

The vast majority of wiretapping cases will never be proved. Most of them will never even be known, for generally only those cases involving well-known persons break into print. Those whose names have cropped up in recent wiretapping episodes range from Senator Joseph R. McCarthy to gangster Tony Bender; from Senator Owen Brewster to Vito Genovese, of Murder, Inc., fame; from labor mediator Cyrus Ching to Howard Hughes; from Thomas E. Dewey to Judith Coplon; from Rocky Graziano to Henry (Mystery Man) Grunewald; from Minot F. (Mickey) Jelke to former Governor of Rhode Island William H. Vanderbilt. The list includes many far less prominent citizens. And, of course, it is still far from complete.

NEITHER Democrats nor Republicans have a monopoly on wiretapping. Past experience has shown that no matter which party is in power in Washington, Federal and Congressional leaders have a tendency to use their authority and the govern-



ment's resources, including wiretapping, to pursue political feuds and personal advantage. Democratically controlled Congressional committees have been discovered employing wiretappers. During the Eightieth Congress, when the Republicans became chair-

Q. AND A. ON WIRETAPPING

(Answers by a telephone company official to questions from a staff member of The Reporter.)

Q. What does the telephone company do if it discovers that a subscriber's line is tapped? Does it remove the tap? Does it notify the customer?

A. Unless the tap is legal, it is removed. The customer may be notified in some cases.

Q. If a customer asks a line check and the company discovers a tap on it, does the company notify the customer of that fact?

A. Where an illegal tap is found and removed, the customer is often advised.

Q. Is there any way to provide tap-proof service?

A. While there are techniques in the art which minimize possibilities of a tap by direct connection or induction we do not know of any practicable method of assuring tap-proof service. While an individual telephone line between the customer's telephone and the central office can be made reasonably tap-proof, such safeguarding measures do not care for the line and telephone instrument at the other end of the conversation.

men of the Congressional committees, the wiretappers found themselves working for new employers, and subsequently there were revelations about the telephonic activities of one Lieutenant Joseph W. Shimon, who had links to Henry Grunewald and the strange far-flung interests of Republican Senator Owen Brewster. Democrats have tapped Republicans and Republicans have tapped Democrats as if they were members of the underworld rather than leaders of a democracy. Now, with the Eisenhower Administration about to take over, it is important to see whether such tactics will still prevail. It is even more important to ascertain what, if anything, the new Administration will do about curbing wiretapping. Among the new men of consequence are several whose sensibilities, to judge from their past records, would not be at all offended by the practice.

WIRETAPPING, in any form, creates a basic American conflict. On one side are the ideals of freedom and individual privacy, on the other the arguments favoring the use of modern techniques to fight crime and to protect national security. Somewhere a line of demarcation must be drawn.

These articles will take up the various phases of the practice of wiretapping—its history, its legal aspects, its technique, its use by the FBI and other government agencies and by police departments, its use in political feuds, its exploitation by all kinds of private interests. But we begin with an explanation of the basic facts of tapping, both historical and technical.

II. Some Law-Evading Enforcement Agencies

IN 1916, the people of New York City were surprised to learn that their mayor, John Purroy Mitchel, had approved an investigation of local Catholic charities on the ground that these groups were out to destroy the public Charity Commission. Surprise turned to shock when New Yorkers read newspaper accounts of the investigative methods being used. With the co-operation of the New York Telephone Company, it was revealed, the Mayor had allowed the tapping of a Catholic priest's telephone.

The telephone company, in answering the charges leveled against it, pointed out that it had co-operated with city officials in this manner ever since 1895, when the police first conceived of the value of tapping telephone wires to obtain evidence. In the intervening years, the New York press had carried stories on a dozen-odd wiretapping cases. Some reported the conviction of criminals by the use of wiretap evidence, others private tapping in divorce cases and in setting up certain swindles. None had evoked more than passing public interest.

The tapping of a priest's phone, however, was too much. Overnight, wiretapping became a subject of popular interest and indignation. A Congressman from New York, George Loft, called for a Congressional investigation of "this gigantic scandal," and a bill outlawing wiretapping was introduced in the New York State legislature. Positive action was delayed, however, by America's entry into the First World War, when the Federal government took over operation of the telephone companies. But in 1918 Congress put an absolute ban on wiretapping for the duration of the emergency.

Prohibition's Role

After the war, with the telephone companies back in private hands and the Congressional ban lifted, wiretapping quickly came back into its own. The first great anti-Red drive was on, and

Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer ordered wiretaps regularly in preparation for his raids. In 1920, when the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect, Treasury Department prohibition agents also began employing wiretapping as a primary weapon.

Soon public reaction set in on a national scale. Citizens who had never considered wiretapping objectionable when used to catch criminals found it repulsive when applied to checking on fellow citizens who held unpopular beliefs. Other citizens objected violently to the use of tapping in prohibition enforcement—a few because they didn't want to see their private bootleggers jailed, many more because they feared that their own telephone orders for supplies might be recorded.

The protests reached Washington, and in 1924 Attorney General Harlan

F. Stone, in a directive to the newly formed Federal Bureau of Investigation, proclaimed, under the heading "Unethical Tactics," that "Wiretapping . . . will not be tolerated . . ."

UNFORTUNATELY, Attorney General Stone's orders applied only to the FBI. Prohibition agents continued tapping without pause. In 1928, a repercussion from their efforts finally reached the Supreme Court. In the case of *Olmstead v. United States*, defense lawyers pleaded for a reversal of a client's conviction for bootlegging on the ground that the wiretapping used to gain evidence violated the Fourth Amendment restriction on search and seizure. In its 5-4 decision, however, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied only to "actual physical invasions" of privacy, and not to "projected voices." The four dissenters were Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Butler, and Stone.

The Olmstead decision only served to intensify public demand for legislation to outlaw wiretapping. In 1929, the first wave of a flood of anti-wiretapping bills engulfed Congress, despite J. Edgar Hoover's concurrent assurance to a House committee that "any employee engaging in wiretapping will be dismissed from the service of the bureau."

"While it may not be illegal," said the FBI Director, "I think it is unethical, and it is not permitted under the regulations of the Attorney General."

Two years later, in 1931, the Prohibition Bureau—still busily tapping away—was transferred from the Treasury to the Justice Department and Attorney General William D. Mitchell found himself forced to settle the internal conflict between FBI and Prohibition Bureau wiretapping policies. Disregarding J. Edgar Hoover's moral scruples, Mitchell decided in favor of wiretapping, subject to "authorization" of the Director of the Bureau.

The FCC and 605

Between the Olmstead decision in 1928 and the first session of the first Roosevelt Congress, numerous bills to outlaw wiretapping were introduced, and in 1933 Congress finally did force some control of tapping by banning its use in the enforcement of prohibition—which went off the books that year anyway.

During the depression years, as labor



became more and more of a political force, its leaders complained with increasing anger about the use of wiretapping in anti-union espionage. With these voices added to those already demanding abolition of the practice, Congress was not long in acting.

In 1934 the Federal Communications Commission was established as an independent agency. Included in the enabling act, as Section 605, was a provision intended to outlaw wiretapping once and for all. It read in part: "No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the . . . contents . . . to any person . . . and no person having received such intercepted communication . . . shall . . . use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another . . ." Violations were made subject to a \$10,000 fine, two years in prison, or both.

WHILE awaiting court interpretation of Section 605, Federal agencies, still operating under Attorney General Mitchell's 1931 approval of wiretapping, continued to tap telephone lines. Local enforcement officers and private detective agencies followed suit.

Three years later, in 1937, the Supreme Court reviewed its first case under Section 605, *Nardone v. United States*. Several defendants who had been found guilty of liquor smuggling now appealed their convictions on the ground that the evidence against them was the product of wiretapping by Federal agents and had thus been gathered in violation of Section 605. Government attorneys freely admitted

the use of wiretapping, but argued that Section 605 did not apply to Federal agents.

The Court sided with the smugglers and reversed their convictions. Section 605, it ruled, was designed "to include within its sweep federal officers as well as others." Since Federal agents had violated Section 605 in intercepting telephone conversations and divulging their contents in court, the government's evidence was inadmissible.

The agents who tapped were therefore guilty of violating a Federal law. It was no surprise, however, that their superiors in the Department of Justice never bothered to prosecute. If the Department had done so, many lawyers feel, the courts would have upheld conviction of the offending agents.

Department of Justice vs. the Law

Over the next three years, the Department of Justice continued to test in court various possible loopholes in Section 605. While it tested, it did nothing to halt continued wiretapping by Federal agents—not only (as was later admitted) in cases of national security, extortion, and kidnaping, but also in investigating such crimes as mail fraud, narcotics peddling, and bribery.

The next tests of Section 605 came in 1939 when the Supreme Court ruled out three more possible Justice Department loopholes in the wiretapping law. The first ruling involved the reconviction of Nardone and associates—this time based not on direct wiretap evidence but on evidence obtained from wiretap "leads." Justice Frankfurter, writing the majority opinion of the Court, termed this evidence "fruit of the poisonous tree." Such "fruit" was ruled as inadmissible in court as direct wiretap evidence, and the supposed smugglers were again freed.

In another 1939 case, *Weiss v. United States*, the Supreme Court closed two more potential loopholes. In one ruling, the Court stated that Section 605 must apply to intra- as well as interstate telephone conversations, since there was no way for a tapper on a line to determine beforehand whether a given call would cross state lines. In the other Weiss ruling, the Supreme Court refused to accept wiretap evidence when the authorization of the "sender," as demanded in Section 605, was obtained after the tapping—in this case, by confronting him with the re-



corded conversations and by promising leniency.

In 1940, a circuit court of appeals further tightened up Section 605, in *Polakoff v. United States*, by stating that under the law, one party could not authorize interception of a conversation on his line unless the other party concurred. The Supreme Court refused to review the decision.

THUS, in their first interpretations of Section 605, the higher courts consistently ruled in favor of a strong wiretapping law. The court rulings were so explicit, in fact, that the Treasury Department began pressing Congress for specific authorization of wiretapping by Federal agents. In 1938, however, J. Edgar Hoover indefinitely postponed chances for such action by opposing a Treasury-drafted bill granting Federal agencies the right to tap. According to newspaper accounts, Hoover "said he had men who were expert in tapping wires, but if he let them practice it to any extent [italics ours] they would turn crooks in no time."

But, to some extent at least, the FBI and other Federal agencies were all tapping during this period. Meanwhile the Department of Justice continued searching for loopholes in Section 605.

On March 12, 1940, however, the Department's search was rudely interrupted by a Senate Interstate Commerce Committee report. The report, approving a proposed Senate investigation of wiretapping, was submitted by Democratic Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana. Wheeler stated:

'INSTRUMENTS OF TYRANNY'

(From the late Justice Louis D. Brandeis's dissenting opinion in the Olmstead case.)

"The tapping of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call or who may call him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping."

"Wiretapping [is] especially dangerous at the present time, because of the recent resurgence of a spy system conducted by Government police. Persons who have committed no crime, but whose economic and political views and activities may be obnoxious to the present incumbents of law-enforcement offices, are being investigated and catalogued."

Off Again, On Again

Exactly five days after release of the Wheeler blast, the Department of Justice banned wiretapping. After nine years of almost unrestricted Federal use since Attorney General Mitchell's authorization in 1931, the practice was now totally prohibited. "In a limited class of cases . . .," said Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, "wiretapping should be authorized under some appropriate safeguard. Under the existing state of the law and decisions, this cannot be done unless Congress sees fit to modify the existing statutes."

On April 9, Jackson repeated his assertion that the ban on wiretapping was not only ethically necessary but was made imperative by court interpretations of Section 605: ". . . the law on wiretapping is now clear and precise; and all future cases of wiretapping will be subject to prosecution in the Federal courts."

At the same time Jackson indicated why no one, even outside government, had been convicted of violation of Sec-



tion 605 in the six years since its enactment: "I do not feel that the Department of Justice can in good conscience prosecute persons . . . for a practice . . . engaged in by the Department itself, and regarded as legal by the Department."

In the light of future events, the last statement was especially important. The following year, the Department embarked on its first and what turned out to be its only prosecution of a violation of Section 605—a violation in which an attorney named Jacob Gruber induced a switchboard girl in the Securities and Exchange Commission to cut him in on telephone conversations involving an investigation of one of his clients. Gruber was convicted, and the conviction stuck.

But only eight weeks after Jackson had declared wiretapping illegal, the Department of Justice quietly did a direct about-face and again authorized the practice. Federal agents have been wiretapping ever since. And in accordance with Jackson's sentiments on prosecuting others "for a practice . . . engaged in by the Department itself," Gruber today remains the only man ever convicted of violating Section 605.

The National Safety

Jackson's original statement of March 17, 1940, declaring the illegality of tapping, had come at an unfortunate time. Russia had recently defeated Finland. Germany was to overrun Denmark and invade Norway within a month. In the United States there was widespread talk of national defense and of possible sabotage.



During the Nazi invasion of the Lowlands, in May, President Roosevelt sent a mysterious memo to the Department of Justice—a memo that was never so much as mentioned until 1949 and which has still not been made public. According to a statement made in 1949 by Attorney General Tom Clark, the May, 1940, memo "approved . . . wiretapping when necessary in situations involving national defense." Why such a memo has never been publicly released is still a matter of conjecture. The best guess is that Roosevelt named specific suspected pro-Nazi Americans whose lines he wished tapped. In support of this theory, Senator Gerald Nye, a prominent supporter of the America First Committee, reportedly told a Washington columnist at the time that J. Edgar

'BEEPS'

Mindful of the Polakoff case, the Federal Communications Commission in 1947 issued a regulation requiring that every telephone-recorder attachment must emit a "beep" warning signal over the wires each fifteen seconds when in operation. Today, with the production of telephone recorders thriving, there are at least a hundred thousand in active use, mostly in private industry but a substantial number in government. Less than ten per cent of these—the Bell System's most recent figure is eight thousand—give the required "beep."

Hoover had privately informed him (Nye) that his wire was being tapped on orders from above.

Whatever the exact wording of the President's memo, however, the general content was enough to cause the Department of Justice to reverse its stand on Section 605. The law on wiretapping was just as "clear and precise" as Jackson had proclaimed it to be two months before, but FBI agents were again authorized to tap wires. Publicly, the Department said nothing; but behind the scenes it was again hunting a loophole in Section 605.

By the end of 1940, the Department had come up with another tenuous justification of its own activities. It had

long been argued that, under the law, wiretapping was of itself no crime and that the only crime was to "intercept and divulge." The little word "and" made all the difference, since it meant that both acts had to be committed before anything illegal had taken place. In backing up this argument, the Department insisted that the entire Federal government was an entity, and thus an agent was not "divulging" to another when he passed wiretap information to his superior, and his superior was not guilty of "divulging" when he passed the information to another government agency or to Congress.

In March, 1941, Attorney General Jackson made this new construction of Section 605 public. "There is no Federal statute that prohibits or punishes wiretapping alone . . .," Jackson said. "Any person, with no risk of penalty, may tap telephone wires and eavesdrop on his competitor, employer, workman, or others, and act upon what he hears or make any use of it that does not involve divulging or publication."

Jackson completely ignored, as the Department of Justice has ever since, the second part of Section 605: "and no person having received such intercepted communication . . . shall . . . use the same . . . for his own benefit or for the benefit of another. . . ." Obviously, without either divulging or using, tapping would be just an idle pastime.

AFTER Jackson's statement, J. Edgar Hoover beat a prompt retreat from the ethical position he had publicly maintained against wiretapping since 1929. He still opposed unrestricted wiretapping, he said, but he thought it should be used in some cases, "such as

espionage, sabotage, kidnaping, and extortion."

Hoover's list reflected the views expressed on then-pending wiretap legislation by President Roosevelt in a letter to Congressman Thomas Eliot in February, 1941—a letter in which the President, perhaps prophetically, warned of possible abuses.


The Court Retreats

In 1942, the Supreme Court, which had previously reaffirmed Section 605 at every opportunity, made its own retreat. In *Goldstein v. United States*, a mail-fraud case, Federal agents had persuaded two men, by showing them recordings of their telephone conversations, to testify in the prosecution of three others. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the three, saying that a person who is not a party to tapped conversations cannot object to their use.

The Court's specific decision, of course, applied only to a few cases. But it was the first interpretation of Section 605 that recognized the admissibility of wiretap-derived information in legal action. The Justice Department was now free to experiment with all sorts of wiretapping methods, evidence from which might or might not be admissible in court. Of one thing at least the Department could be certain: No agent would go to jail. To date, the Department seems quite satisfied with things as they are. In 1949, it did draft a bill to sanction Federal wiretapping. But two months later, when the anti-wiretapping forces began to organize, it promptly withdrew the bill. Meanwhile, despite Section 605, Federal wiretapping continues as a daily practice.

STATE laws are of little help in controlling wiretapping. Forty-two states restrict tapping in some manner, but only two—Delaware and New Jersey—outlaw divulgence in court, while at least seven others, including Massachusetts and New York, permit wiretapping by local law-enforcement officers.

Nor is the Federal Communications Commission any help. The Justice Department, not the FCC, is charged with enforcing Section 605, as the FCC has had to point out to many irate citizens, including a Detroit businessman who wrote recently to complain about a tap



on the phone of a daughter who was suing her husband for divorce. The FCC could only refer him to the Justice Department and the Attorney General.

If the Attorney General answered the Detroiter at all, which is unlikely, he might have quoted his predecessor in office, Robert Jackson: "I do not feel that the Department of Justice can in good conscience prosecute persons . . . for a practice engaged in by the Department itself."

BEEPLESS TOBEY

Perhaps it's too much to expect the average citizen to observe the FCC's regulation requiring a "beep" warning on his telephone-recorder attachment when the man who was ranking member of the Senate committee overseeing the FCC at the time of the order's adoption has been guilty of its most sensational violation.

In April, 1951, Senator Charles W. Tobey, at a secret meeting of the Senate subcommittee investigating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, disclosed that he had, without President Truman's knowledge, recorded two conversations between himself and the President concerning alleged Congressional pressure on the FCC. When the story leaked, the President termed Tobey's action "outrageous." Senator Tobey, with an air of injured innocence, said it was "no secret" that he used a recorder or that many other Senators did likewise.

Presently, Joseph C. Duke, Senate sergeant-at-arms, after announcing that he was having a "beep" adjustment made to the Senator's machine, quietly secured copies of the FCC order and laid one neatly on the desk of each Senator.



III. How to Tap A Telephone

SEVERAL years ago, a New York newspaper columnist informed local readers that now they too could discover if their telephone lines were being tapped. In New York, it was explained, anyone could check on a tap by dialing 711, waiting for the tone, then dialing 6 and hanging up. If the phone rang back, the line was free; if it didn't ring, a tap was in.

Actually, 711 . . . 6 was just a telephone-company test circuit. A ring-back signified only that the line was in working order. The test could not possibly indicate wiretapping. The columnist's following was large, however, and after a deluge of dialing, the telephone company was forced to change the number of its test circuit.

The 711 . . . 6 detection method may well be the best-publicized wiretapping myth in the history of the telephone, but it is not the most prevalent. That distinction belongs to the widely held theory that crackling noises on a line mean the wires are tapped. Telephone static is frequent and has various causes, including loose connections, moisture in the line, and dust between contact points. On the other hand, only the most amateurish "raw" tap could

cause static. Usually the noise disappears on a second call. Seldom does it continue for more than two or three hours, and a wiretap is rarely installed for so short a period.

RANKING almost with the static test is the popular misconception that rapping on the mouthpiece of a telephone set with a pencil will make the conversation inaudible to the wiretapper. A hidden microphone, or "bug," can be neutralized by such rapping—as well as by clinking ice in a glass, jingling keys, or running water. But a wiretapper won't be bothered by noise in the mouthpiece any more than those who are holding the conversation. If they can hear, so can he.

Other myths hold that a bad tap will heat up the earpiece of the telephone set and that, if the conversation is being recorded, the scratching of the recording needle may be heard faintly. The first is electrically impossible, the second highly improbable.

As previously indicated, a sloppy job can result in continued static. It can also cause diminution of volume on the line, or even a complete shorting out. But few taps are installed by amateurs;


the wiretapping business is dominated by former telephone-company employees and by agents trained in wiretapping at one or more law-enforcement schools.

Unfortunately, the telephone company, despite its frequently expressed concern, has not much more chance of discovering an unsuspected tap than the individual subscriber has. The company does test its lines continually, but the testing equipment is incapable of spotting an effective wiretap.

Occasionally, a telephone-company repairman on his normal rounds will stumble upon a tap and remove it. About as often, a private citizen will hire a wiretapper to check his lines for taps, the going rate ranging from twenty to fifty dollars. Some Federal agencies have regular tapcheckers on their staffs. None of this, of course, precludes a tap's being installed five minutes after a check is made. But physical inspection, at every possible point of installation from the phone itself right back to the "main frame" at the exchange, still remains the only positive means of detection.

OVER the years, many machines advertised as capable of tap detection have been placed on the market, some for \$200, some for much more. Congressmen and police officers have been among the purchasers. All have been bilked; no machine yet invented can positively identify a wiretap.

The simple fact is that a good tap upsets a telephone circuit much less than does normal line trouble, such as



Normal phone circuit, showing bridging (potential tapping) points



dust and moisture seepage, corrosion, and faulty contact points, all of which are far more prevalent. When the "detection" machine's red light glows or its bell rings, it is indicating more dramatically what the telephone company's test equipment also shows—imbalance in the circuit. Unless the machine is extremely sensitive, it will not register the slight imbalance resulting from a tap. And if it is sensitive enough to register a tap, it is also so sensitive that it will continually explode into false alarms.

Tools of the Trade

Basically, the telephone circuit is not difficult to understand once one accepts the word "circuit" for what it means: a closed circle of wire in which current flows, that current in turn being able to carry voice vibrations.

At one end, the circle of wire enters the individual phone, passes through it, and emerges at the same spot. The entering wire and the emerging wire are then wrapped together as a "pair" for stringing back to the telephone exchange. At the exchange, the circle of those two wires is completed whenever the telephone is in use. In a normal local call, the pair of wires is joined at the exchange, through a relay, to the pair of wires leading to another telephone, and the conversation circuit is thus established.

Electric current must flow through the circuit, of course, in order to carry the voice vibrations. Every telephone exchange houses long banks of batteries to supply direct current, that current being thrown onto the line whenever the telephone is in use.

The wiretapper's fundamental equipment, based on this completed circuit, is quite simple. He needs earphones, and he needs a wire leading through those earphones, the ends of which can be easily attached to each member of the pair he wishes to tap, thus forming an additional path for current in the circuit.

The tapper also must interpose in his extension wires a condenser—an elec-

trical device that blocks the passage of direct current while still allowing the detection of faint vibrations. Electricity always follows the line of least resistance. Without the condenser, part of the direct current from the exchange would flow through the tapper's earphones, bypassing the normal circuit. The voice volume on the tapped conversation circuit would diminish sharply, and the wiretapper would serve notice of his activities.

On the other hand, the tapper's condenser must be small in its electrical capacity. If it is too large, it will also attract current from the normal circuit. A .01-microfarad condenser is fairly standard in the wiretapping trade.

"WALKING, RIDING OR FLYING"

(Excerpt from a sales letter.)

'Walkie-Recordall' — world's smallest, lightest, self-powered Briefcase type Combination Sound-Recorder-Reproducer picks up and records audible speech, undetected, at a radius up to 40 feet, as well as voices whispered into the microphone or telephone—indoors or outdoors—while stationary or mobile—and in any position while walking, riding or flying.

Along with the condenser, the wiretapper also hooks into his line a large resistor—nothing more than a coil or a wire through which current passes with difficulty. The resistor forces even more of the direct current in the telephone circuit to follow its normal, established path, thus further cutting the drag from the tap. The resistor does weaken the signal coming through the tap extension, but the tapper can always compensate by adding an amplifier to increase volume.

This, then, is the wiretapper's basic equipment: earphones, wire, condenser, resistor, and, if necessary, amplifier. If possession of these few electrical parts made a wiretapper, however, almost everyone in the nation could be one. The parts are all contained in the smallest home or car radio, the radio loudspeaker substituting for the earphones.

Actually, the expert wiretapper needs much more. He needs to know how to trace an entire circuit from the

individual phone back to the exchange, and where to tap along that circuit without arousing suspicion. This requires a sound working knowledge of the telephone company's entire physical plant, as well as effective use of company lingo to obtain added information not normally available to the outsider. The professional tapper also needs additional equipment, including recording devices, adaptors for these devices to permit telephone transcription, and machines to translate dial beats into actual telephone numbers. He needs concealed space for himself and his equipment—a "plant" where a line can be monitored for days and even weeks without observation. And he needs assistants to help with the twenty-four-hour-a-day job of monitoring. All these—equipment, plant, and assistants—require sizable outlays of cash.

IN CHOOSING where to "go on" any specific telephone circuit, the wiretapper is far more limited than might be expected. He can't very well tap at the subscriber's end of the line without being seen. Nor can he tap at the exchange. In times past, the telephone company did permit certain official agencies to install "back-taps" on the exchange main frame, but today, except in very special cases, it is reluctant to co-operate to that extent.

The tapper is limited in his hookups to that segment of the circuit removed from the immediate vicinity of both the subscriber and the exchange. Such a segment may stretch several miles. But again, the tapper is limited.

When the pair of wires leaves the subscriber's premises, it travels to a nearby terminal box, or "bridging point," where the two wires are connected to twin metal posts labeled with a pair number. The terminal box, however, also serves as a bridging point for the pairs of various other subscribers in the vicinity, all such pairs being simi-



larly attached to numbered posts. Dozens and even hundreds of subscriber pairs may terminate in one box.

The pairs do not leave the terminal box separately. Instead, many are enclosed in a single cable for ease in transmission to the exchange—initially by poles in suburban areas, then by underground cable in the city. Inside the cable, all pairs look alike; singling out a desired pair for tapping is practically impossible.

In the cable, the pairs generally travel to a second bridging point, where they are again attached to posts bearing their pair number, where they are joined by additional pairs, and where the additional pairs are then encased with them for further transmission to the exchange. Before reaching the exchange office, a residential pair may pass through five or six bridging points, a business-district pair through three or four. The final cable leading into the exchange office often contains as many as 2,120 pairs.

The complete telephone exchange is thus much like a tree, with subscribers' phones as the outermost twigs. The twigs combine into branches, the branches into limbs, and the limbs into the trunk and roots, which are the exchange office.

Finding the Right Pair

To the wiretapper, it makes no difference whether a given cable contains twelve pairs or 2,120 pairs. Even if he opened the cable, he would be unable to identify the specific pair he wanted. His basic plan, therefore, is to learn the pair number, find the bridging points for that numbered pair, and then tap in at one of those points—the choice of which bridging point to tap being determined by the availability of space nearby to use for the "plant."

Because of the need for space in which to listen unobserved, a residential-telephone job is the wiretapper's toughest assignment. A hotel job, in

which a room can be taken on short notice, is easiest, with apartment and office-building assignments running a close second.

The residential job is doubly difficult because the wiretapper can't afford to use the first bridging point—the terminal box on a nearby pole, from which the "drop" carries the subscriber's pair into his home. That terminal box is especially valuable to the tapper. It is not only the easiest bridging point to locate; it is also the only bridging point to which the subscriber's line can be directly traced and the pair number of that line thus individually identified. If the tapper were seen climbing that pole, however, his entire efforts might be nullified by the suspicions of his intended victim.

IN SUCH a situation, the professional wiretapper, unless he has access to inside information, relies on his knowledge of the telephone company, and on the fact that in a big city the company employees are so many that they can't all know each other by name. He starts only with his victim's number, obtained from the telephone book, and with the knowledge that the letters in that number indicate the exchange. He dials the same exchange letters, and follows with the series of digits he knows will connect him with the exchange repair clerk—in Washington, for example, 9960.

To the unsuspecting clerk the tapper gives a false name, says he's out checking trouble on a certain line, and repeats his victim's telephone number to identify that line. Then he asks for the pair and cable numbers—the latter mainly for effect. The clerk gives him both.

Having obtained the pair number, the wiretapper then calls cable records for the location of the bridging points of the desired pair. Again, he must have the telephone-company lines go down to perfection. In the Bronx and Manhattan exchanges, they are called "bridging heads." But in Washington, they are called "multiples," and elsewhere they are known as "appearances." The tapper must use the proper expression. If he is a professional, he will. If the cable-records clerk is no more than normally astute, the tapper will get the information he requests.

The wiretapper then knows the number of his victim's pair, and he

LOCKS AND BOXES

(Report of subcommittee of the Senate District of Columbia Committee to investigate wiretapping in the District of Columbia, January, 1951)

"Your subcommittee is impressed by the ease with which unauthorized persons, such as Lieutenant Shimon, can invade the privacy of telephone conversations. Lieutenant Shimon testified that by allowing the persons on the repair desk of the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. to believe that he was a telephone repairman he was able to get the location of the telephone box and the appropriate pair number. . . . Your subcommittee recommends that the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. address itself to the technical problem of protecting the secrecy of telephone conversations; for example, the relatively simple device of placing locks on such terminal boxes would materially assist in preventing unauthorized access to them. Unquestionably, technically qualified persons could develop additional safeguards to hamper the practice of wire tapping and more adequate methods for detecting it when it occurs."

knows that the pair runs from the original terminal box to a second bridging point on a telephone pole five blocks east, from there to a third bridging point on a pole five blocks south, and that from there it dives underground to a fourth bridging point in a cellar three more blocks south, where it finally enters an underground cable to the exchange. He can appear at any one of those bridging points without arousing the suspicions of his victim, and he can locate the line he wants by the pair number registered next to the terminal posts.

As to the "plant," the tapper may find a vacant house or apartment to rent near one of the bridging points. He then simply attaches his clips to the twin terminal posts of the pair and strings his wire inside. If he can't find vacant space, perhaps he will find that one of the bridging points is in a secluded spot, where he can park without attracting attention. He then strings his wires down from the pole or up from the cellar and into the car, where he



sets up his battery-operated recording equipment.

If neither of these plans can be worked out to satisfaction at the bridging points in question, the wiretapper has one other alternative: In almost every terminal box, there are not only pairs in active use, but also "spare pairs." The spare pairs, like the multitude of bridging points, give the telephone system fluidity. If a new building goes up, the company doesn't need to string wires all the way back to the exchange. To service that building it can install telephones merely by bridging to nearby points and using spare pairs for transmission.

In the meantime, however, the wiretapper can use these spare pairs, easily identified because they are dead lines. He finds the spare pair at the same bridging point as the pair he wants to tap. He connects the spare-pair wires to the terminal posts of the victim's pair. Then he calls the clerk at the trouble desk again, gets the bridging point locations for the spare-pair number, and checks those locations for nearby vacant houses. Eventually, he is bound to find an ideal "plant."

TAPPING hotel, apartment, or office-building telephones, as noted above, is far more simple. In a hotel, the pairs of all the phones on any floor generally lead to a terminal box or "house box" in the hallway on that floor. If the tapper gets a room on the same floor as his victim, he can just open the house box, where he will find each pair tagged by room number, and cross the pair of his own room phone over to the terminal posts of his victim's phone. The wires are thus pre-strung for the tapper; he just clamps his equipment to the bell box in his room and "opens the plant."

Apartments and office telephone tapping follows a like procedure as long as space can be rented in the same building—the only difference being that the terminal boxes in these buildings are generally located in the basement, where a janitor may have to be bluffed by telephone credentials or be bribed with money while the pair leading to the newly rented space is crossed to the terminal posts of the victim's pair.

Since wiretappers are not likely to be held to any expense allowance, money for bribes is readily available.

And since most tappers are former telephone workers, the old pass can always be shown. "Some janitors are pretty smart, though," one professional tapper remarked. "They'll ask to see your tools, knowing they should be stamped 'Bell System.' When I went into the business, I bought a whole new set of tools, and gave them to a guy still working for Bell in return for his used tools.



The only thing was, his old tools had the Bell stamp on them."

Hotel, apartment, and office telephone tapping may be complicated by inability to rent space in the same building. In such a case, the wiretapper must again go to the clerk on the trouble desk. But bridging points for such telephone circuits, while not so many in number as in a residential area, are generally located in the basements of other buildings. Some of these buildings are certain to have space available for a plant.

Avoiding 'Phhps' and Such

Before opening any plant, however, the professional wiretapper employs a technique that is little known even in telephone-company circles and that enables him to avoid tapping in while a conversation is in progress—an act which would immediately tip off the victim.

During a telephone conversation, direct current flows in the circuit. If the wiretapper snaps his clips to the terminal posts at the bridging point, some of that current will rush back to fill his condenser plate. And no matter how small that condenser, the listener will hear a "phhp" on the line as the tapper's condenser is charged.

To avoid this "phhp," the tapper attaches one clip to one terminal. Then, with the tap circuit still open, he places the other clip between his thumb and forefinger, licks his forefinger, and places the wet finger on the other

terminal. The tap circuit is complete, but a wet finger is such a poor conductor that not enough current will flow through it to charge the tapper's condenser instantaneously. The "phhp" is avoided, but the tapper can still hear the conversation very faintly. Then, testing with the finger occasionally, he is able to delay installation of the tap until the line is free.

THE expert wiretapper has several other ingenious little tricks that he uses on select occasions. One involves getting special numbers out of the telephone company. Actually, in many communities there are four classes of telephone numbers: listed (in the phone directory); unlisted (public but not yet listed); nonpublished (confidential); and special nonpublished (top secret). The first two anyone can discover. The third can be obtained by tracing the subscriber's wires from his phone to the terminal box, getting the pair number, and then bluffing the cable-records clerk into divulging the "drop number," or regular telephone number.

The records of special nonpublished numbers are even more difficult to obtain. There is one chance—by getting the pair number, tracing it through the bridging points to find the cable number, picking up a dozen other cable numbers in the process, and then calling the cable department and using the familiar language to request the "drop numbers" of all dozen cable pairs, including the desired one. In the cable department the number is not usually tagged as special nonpublished.

ONE LAST special trick is now fairly outmoded. But in the first days of the dial telephone, the wiretapper was confronted with a serious problem. Since the tapped victim no longer spoke out the number he was calling, and since no one could count the clicks of the dial pulse accurately, the wiretapper found it impossible in many cases to report on whom the victim was calling. Soon a solution was discovered. The tapper learned that if he shorted a wire across the pair momentarily while the dialing was in progress, the victim would get a wrong number, or no number at all. After two or three misdials, the victim would dial the operator and give his number orally. The wiretapper could then jot down



that number and let the next call go through unmolested.

To check the name of the subscriber at the number jotted down, the tapper could go to friends in the telephone company or could again bluff the "drop" name out of the clerk on the trouble desk. In some cities, however, the name of the subscriber, providing his number was published, could be obtained merely by dialing the same exchange letters as in the number, followed by a special set of digits. In Chicago, this applies today, the series of digits being 2080.

Certain Refinements

Since the days of shorting out to get a dial number, Kenneth Ryan, a former New York police detective who has been called the top wiretapping technician in the nation, has adapted a pulse-recording machine for intercepting purposes, a machine that punches out the pulses of the dial on tape, so that they can be counted and decoded into telephone numbers.

This machine, which has been sold by some for as high as \$400, is only one of the devices an expert wiretapper uses today in addition to earphones, condensers, and resistors. Recording machines are also essential, and although Ryan says he can adapt the best machine in the country for tap work and sell it for \$250, some wiretappers pay as high as \$980 for a single machine, all possible attachments included.

Another machine used by some wiretappers is the voice-activated "start-stopper," one model of which retails for \$90. The start-stopper is designed to start a tapped-in recording machine whenever voices come over the circuit, and to stop the recorder from three to fifteen seconds after the voices cease, depending on how the tapper sets it. Since the more expensive recording machines will transcribe for eight continuous hours, the stop-starter permits

the wiretapper to dispense with paid assistants for monitoring work.

Kenneth Ryan, however, has no faith in the voice-activation principle. He claims that a stop-starter so activated will start at any noise at voice level on the line. But Ryan says he has just developed a current-activated start-stopper, based on the fact that direct current only flows through the line when the telephone circuit is completed. His machine, he claims, would make it possible for the first time to get efficient tap results from an unattended recorder.

ping equipment can translate the radiation back into voices. Thus the induction coil removes the need for direct connection with the tapped pair.

Business Week's piece quoted William G. H. Finch, an outstanding electronics engineer, as saying that an induction coil selling at \$4.85 could pick up telephone conversations through a wall and up to a distance of thirty feet. "A direct tap," said Finch, "belongs to the horse-and-buggy days."

Finch is a technical expert, and all but his last remark is probably true, under ideal conditions. But the fact is that an A.C. electric cord placed anywhere near the telephone pair in a room will cause enough radiation to drown out the radiation of the phone wires.

More important, an induction coil can be used only where the telephone pair to be tapped is not near any other pair. The coil will pick up all conversations from all pairs in a cable, for example. It is therefore of use only in a place where the desired pair exists alone and without interference.

In most telephone circuits, there is no such place. In a residential circuit, the "drop" from the terminal box to the home might be such a place, as might be the subscriber's premises. This, a professional wiretapper would be forced to point out, is a hell of a place to install a tap and open a plant. It would be simpler to marry the subscriber.

It seems obvious that the public remarks of men like Finch, who are genuine communications scientists but seem totally unaware of the pragmatic considerations involved in wiretapping, do nothing but propagate the myth of what might be called "Buck Rogers wiretapping," enormously widespread and impossible to control. Even limited wiretapping is not a pleasant thought to the free man. There is no point in exaggerating.



In recent years, still another wiretapping device, the induction coil, has been publicized by national magazines ranging from *Popular Science* to *Business Week* and dramatically portrayed as the be-all and end-all of wiretapping—infallible, undetectable, and sinister. Actually, few self-respecting wiretappers would have an induction coil in their tool boxes.

The coil works on a simple principle: Electrical impulses flow through the pair in the completed conversation circuit. But these impulses also set into motion electrons in the air surrounding the pair, forming a field of radiation. An induction coil is so constructed that it can pick up this radiation in the air; and once picked up, quite normal tap-



IV. Little Politicians Have Big Ears

IN WASHINGTON, coffee nerves and wiretap nerves are equally common ailments. In the past few years hundreds in the capital have complained about their wires being tapped. Although proof of the alleged wiretapping has seldom been forthcoming, the list of complainants continues to grow. For being a tap victim has become as important to a politician's prestige as a duodenal ulcer is to that of a New York advertising executive.

"Certainly my lines are tapped," one Congressman recently insisted, as if he feared someone might deny it. Rumors of private political tapping have mounted to the point where few high officials feel free to talk openly over the telephone. Such apprehensions are frequently enough buttressed by fact as one lurid wiretapping story after another comes to light.

Cyrus Ching, the labor mediator, has told friends that during his efforts to settle a strike last year his wires were tapped by agents of both the company and the union. Charges have been made that Robert La Borde, a New York professional tapper, was hired by private-utility interests to tap the wires of U.S. Supreme Court Justices while the Court was deciding a case involving the Tennessee Valley Authority. Perhaps the most fantastic story of all was the rumor recently spread by a government employee involved in an office feud that he had tapped the telephone of Walter Bedell Smith, head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Lieutenant's Profitable Hobby

The career of Lieutenant Joseph W. Shimon of the Washington police force presents almost unparalleled examples of the intricacies of political tapping. The Shimon case got an airing during a 1950 Senatorial inquiry into wiretapping in the District of Columbia. It had many Congressional and business ramifications, and offered a fairly sordid picture of what happens when certain high legislators ally themselves

with wiretappers and other undercover interests. Lieutenant Shimon, a police wiretapper and investigator, has always found time to practice his trade on the side, not only for Washington socialites bringing divorce actions, but also for a sizable number of Republican politicians, including Senator Owen Brewster and former Representative W. Kingsland Macy.

Shimon, a sharp-faced man with a taste for two-tone shoes and peaked lapels, joined the Washington police department in 1929, became a detective sergeant in 1933, and rose to be a lieutenant. In 1938, he was a member of what he has called the "strong-arm squad." "We went into every [Negro] dive and every joint," Shimon has explained. "We worked nights and days and we just messed them up.... Where we could not go ahead legally we knocked the doors down and chased them out of town."

Between lessons in this least subtle police technique, Shimon found time



to pick up one of the most delicate—wiretapping. From 1936 to 1940, he was personally involved in a large number of tapping episodes, including police investigations of a safe-cracking mob, a holdup man, a narcotics syndicate, and an abortion ring. The young detective learned quickly, and before long he himself was installing taps with an almost professional touch.

In 1940, Shimon was transferred to the local U.S. Attorney's office, where he was to remain until 1949, and where he was immediately placed in charge of a special investigating squad. It was a real break. He was given a staff of his own; he was freed from his old superiors in the Washington police department; and he found his new bosses quite lax in their supervision.

A second important event in Shimon's career occurred at about the same time, when he met Harry (the Dutchman) Grunewald, private investigator, political fixer, and confidant of such men as Senators Owen Brewster and Styles Bridges. Grunewald, who is no more of a "mystery man" than is indicated by the above-mentioned activities and associates, and who was certainly no mystery to Shimon, offered to act as contact man for his new-found protégé. The lieutenant was soon on his way up in the world of political wiretapping.

Excellent References

Today, Shimon can boast of several letters from well-known politicians praising him for work described only as "special" or "confidential." Owen Brewster has written of "exemplary" work; W. Kingsland Macy of jobs "skillfully" done.

Shimon can also boast of a good outside income, all built up while he was a full-time member of the Washington police force. William Nolan, a onetime associate in an extra-vocational business venture, has been quoted as saying: "Lieutenant Shimon never worked on a wire job that he did not at least get a thousand dollars, and I worked on a wire job with him." A former subordinate, police officer John H. McHale, told the Senatorial committee in 1950 that Shimon had boastfully displayed a \$1,000 bill a couple of days after completing a wiretapping assignment for Owen Brewster.

Brewster has maintained that Shimon's services were obtained at the suggestion of Senator Styles Bridges, who had once praised Shimon's work for him as "eminently satisfactory services under the most difficult circumstances." Brewster has said that Shimon was hired only to watch a man who was allegedly shadowing Brewster. However, the Senatorial hearings threw some interesting light on the extent of Shimon's work.

In 1945, Pan American Airways threw its full influence behind a so-called "chosen-instrument" air-transport bill—designed to eliminate all overseas competition among U.S. airlines in favor of a single authorized line. Pan American expected to be the line chosen, and in attempting to pick this luscious plum it had the full support of Senator Brewster, who pushed the bill in the Senate Commerce Committee, of which he was a minority member. At the same time, since there was strong Congressional objection to P.A.A. getting this air monopoly, the firm hired Henry Grunewald to keep tabs on the opposition.

The most vociferous opponent was Senator Josiah Bailey of North Carolina, then chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. Bailey, a steadfast believer in free competition, refused to support the bill even after Brewster hopped a special P.A.A. plane to North Carolina on a mission of persuasion.

When it was reluctantly concluded that Bailey could not be won over by Brewster's logic, the "chosen-instrument" men decided that it might be possible to catch Bailey conspiring with Pan American's chief overseas rival, Howard Hughes's Trans World Airlines, which strongly opposed the bill.

At this point, through the good offices of the Brewster-Grunewald-P.A.A. axis, Lieutenant Shimon was called in. One day in the fall of 1945 (Shimon's friend William Nolan later testified), Nolan drove the lieutenant to an apart-

ment building in the 2500 block of Q Street. According to Nolan, Shimon installed, in the basement of the building, a tap on the telephone line of Senator Bailey. Nolan recalled that the tap was used for the better part of a week and that it involved "something about airplanes."

Shimon was no doubt paid for his efforts, but otherwise the tap was hardly a success. Senator Bailey continued his opposition, and the "chosen-instrument" bill was defeated.

Brewster's Flop Extravaganza

Two years later the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress was riding high, and Senator Brewster had become chairman of the old Truman Senatorial committee investigating war contracts. Brewster was still interested in P.A.A.'s plan for an overseas air monopoly, and began pressing again from his new position of power. According to the later testimony of Howard Hughes, Brewster came to Hughes privately in February, 1947, and urged him to merge T.W.A. with Pan American. When Hughes refused, he testified, Brewster countered with a threat to investigate, through his war-contracts committee, Hughes's costly government-financed project to build an enormous flying boat. Hughes remained firm, and Brewster's committee went to work.

So did Shimon. In the spring of 1947, the lieutenant began installing wire-taps with such frequency that he was

forced to recruit several members of his district-attorney squad for monitoring duties. He confided to one officer that he was working for a "committee on the Hill." Later he asked another subordinate to pay special attention to conversations concerning airplanes in general and Trans World Airlines in particular.

The first tap was installed in the 2500 block of Q Street, the same block in which Senator Bailey's line had been tapped two years earlier. Shimon's man had heard only one conversation, however, when telephone-company men arrived and discovered the tap. The victim has never been identified.

Untroubled by this setback, Shimon proceeded to install taps at a pole box on Connecticut Avenue, at an apartment building in Sixteenth Street, and at the Occidental Hotel downtown. The lieutenant, who has admitted that all four taps involved the same investigation, later blandly claimed before the Senate committee that he was after a "Miami fugitive," despite the totally contradictory testimony of all his subordinate police monitors.

According to the testimony of officer McHale, the "Miami fugitive" at the Occidental Hotel was one Hugh Fulton. Fulton had been the committee counsel of the war-contracts investigating committee when Truman had headed it, but was, in 1947, an attorney for T.W.A. and Howard Hughes.

On several mornings during two or three weeks, McHale borrowed sound-recording equipment from an electronics supply house and then drove Shimon to the Occidental, where Fulton had an office. The lawyer's conversations with such notables as Andrew J. Higgins, the shipbuilder, and former Democratic Senator James M. Mead, as well as with T.W.A. officials, were all faithfully transcribed. During this period, according to McHale, Shimon conferred regularly with Henry Grunewald. Soon Brewster's committee decided it had enough evidence to proceed with public hearings on the Hughes flying-boat project.

Asleep at the Tap

On July 17, eleven days before the hearings were scheduled to begin, Thomas Slack, a T.W.A. lawyer, and Noah Dietrich, a Hughes executive, arrived in Washington to prepare Hughes's defense. Unfortunately, Shimon



on did not learn of their presence until July 22. The next day the lieutenant rented a room adjoining their suite at the Carlton Hotel, and installed a tap on their telephone line. For four days, Shimon and his subordinates recorded regular conversations over the tapped line. But on July 26, less than forty-eight hours before the hearings were to start, the conversations suddenly ceased.

For ten subsequent days, while Hughes and his associates attended hearings daily, the Brewster committee had an unhappy time. Hughes was not only an aggressive witness, but he made some embarrassing allegations about Senator Brewster. For ten days also, Lieutenant Shimon was unhappy. Puzzled, he maintained a silent vigil at the Carlton. For the same ten days, Slack and Dietrich enjoyed complete privacy of communication only three blocks away at the Mayflower.

When, on August 5, Shimon belatedly learned of the switch in hotels, he hurriedly checked out of the Carlton. The next day he registered at the Mayflower as Joseph W. Diamond of Roanoke, Virginia. A tap was again installed without delay, and for the next five days every telephone conversation of Slack or Dietrich was recorded. On August 11, the Brewster hearings ended, the two Hughes officials checked out of the Mayflower, and Joseph W. Diamond decided to do likewise.

Within a few months, Shimon was back at work on Capitol Hill. This time, his services were requested by Republican Representative W. Kingsland Macy of New York, then Chairman of the House subcommittee on questionable trade practices. On January 8, 1948, Shimon moved into the Graylyn Hotel, to tap wires of Advice, Inc., a firm dealing in scarce commodities, whose office was just a few doors down from the Graylyn. For more than two weeks, the taps proved fruitful. But on January 24, the line went dead—the result, according to Shimon, of others trying to tap the same telephone.

Although as this is written Shimon is under dismissal charges for alleged perjury before the Senate committee that looked into his activities in 1950, he still clings to his lieutenancy in the Metropolitan Police Force, by virtue of influential friends and by virtue of the familiar Justice Department laxity in prosecuting wiretapping cases.

Eavesdropping on Bedell Smith?

Within the past year, there have been persistent rumors that certain employees of the Army Signal Corps Intelligence Agency (a special section concerned primarily with communications intelligence work) have listened to tapped telephone conversations of the Central Intelligence Agency chief, General Walter Bedell Smith. This much has been pieced together by the writers of this article, through interviews and newspaper accounts:

In the fall of 1951, ten members of the Signal Corps Intelligence Agency, several of them former CIA workers, banded together under the leadership of one Edwin Y. Webb to discuss their common distrust of certain fellow employees in both SCIA and CIA. Under the guidance of Webb, a militant Southerner and former technician with the Atlanta telephone company, they compiled a list of a dozen-odd people—most of them Jewish. Some of the dozen they suspected of being Communist spies; some they merely labeled "pinks." All were safe in their jobs, it was claimed, due to the favoritism of top officials.

Webb and his band, including six other civilian employees, a lieutenant colonel, a captain, and a lieutenant, decided they could not press their charges through official channels, since such action would probably lead only to their own dismissals. Instead, they managed to set up a pipeline to the political commentator Fulton Lewis, Jr.

In mid-December, Lewis rewarded their efforts with two syndicated newspaper articles entitled "Our Security Agencies Infiltrated by Reds." The articles were general in nature, and appeared to be the opening blasts of a long series. But for some reason Lewis dropped the subject after the second installment.

Webb, whom Lewis had obliquely referred to as a "genius," then took his information, in rapid succession, to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee headed by Pat McCarran of Nevada; the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the *Times-Herald*, Washington affiliate of the *Chicago Tribune*.

About four hours after Webb delivered his documentation to the *Times-Herald* he received a call from a friend at the Central Intelligence Agency,



who informed him that Bedell Smith had been told what was going on.

It was immediately after this, according to Webb's original story, that he listened in on Smith's telephone conversations, at a tap installed somewhere along the banks of the Potomac River.

In the meantime a complete investigation of Webb's accusations had been ordered by Army Intelligence. Fifteen agents spent six weeks checking on each person accused by the Webb group, after which Major General A. R. Bolling, then head of G-2, pronounced all the charges "groundless." Webb was then eased out of SCIA, but has since ended up in a top communications job with the Office of Civilian Defense.

As to the wiretapping, according to General Bolling, Webb denied the practice: "He laughed it off," the general reported, "Said he'd spread the story of tapping just to stir up public interest." Bolling himself believes that the tapping rumors are unfounded.

One former CIA employee closely associated with Webb, however, still insists the tapping was done. Also, Representative Francis Walter, a member of the Un-American Activities Committee, reports that his check of committee files "bears out the charge of wiretapping in this particular case." In addition, when a reporter recently asked Webb himself if tapping had been involved, he replied, "And how!" Two days later, when the same reporter called again, Webb was much less committal. He asked how the reporter had learned of the wire work and refused to discuss the matter fur-

CONVERSATION PIECE

(Tapped telephone conversation between Frank Costello and Thomas A. Aurelio the morning after Aurelio's nomination as Justice of the New York Supreme Court—as reported in the New York Times, August 29, 1943.)

AURELIO: Good morning, Francesco, how are you and thanks for everything.

COSTELLO: Congratulations. It went over perfect. When I tell you something is in the bag, you can rest assured.

AURELIO: It was perfect. Arthur Klein did the nominating; first me, then Gavagan, then Peck. It was fine.

COSTELLO: That's fine.

AURELIO: The doctor called me last night to congratulate me. I'm going to see him today. He seems to be improving. He should be up and around soon and should take the train for Hot Springs.

COSTELLO: That's the plan.

AURELIO: —— congratulated me. That's a fellow you should do something for. He certainly deserves something.

COSTELLO: Well, we will have to get together, you, your Mrs. and myself, and have dinner some night real soon.

AURELIO: That would be fine, but right now I want to assure you of my loyalty for all you have done. It's undying. . . .

ther. Whether or not the tapping was actually done thus remains a matter of conjecture. At the same time, the mere possibility of such an act would seem to merit Congressional investigation.

Dewey, O'Dwyer, and Bugs

Not all political wiretapping, of course, takes place in Washington or involves Federal officials. Wiretapping is practiced quite extensively in state politics. Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York has not been averse to using tap-obtained information in attempting to get the goods on his Democratic foes in Albany. In 1940, a Congressional committee learned that a Democratic state legislator, Senator Ruth of Pennsylvania, had employed state policemen to tap the telephone lines of Mayor S. Davis Wilson of Philadelphia when the committee Ruth headed was investigating the city judiciary. In the same year, Frank B. Bielaski's detective agency in New York, which had done much work for the Republican National Committee and for G.O.P. politicians in such states as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, was exposed as having tapped the wires of public officials in Rhode Island.

Bielaski's agents had installed four taps, one in Pawtucket and three in Providence. The Pawtucket tap was on the home telephone of the Democratic Mayor, Thomas P. McCoy. The three Providence taps were all on the telephones of the Republican State Attorney General, Louis V. Jackvony, on

lines at his home, his private law offices, and his public office in the courthouse.

Although the two officials tapped belonged to opposing political parties, they had one thing in common: Each had earned the enmity of the Republican Governor, William H. Vanderbilt. When the taps were first discovered, J. Howard McGrath, then U.S. Attorney for Rhode Island, investigated. A few weeks later, McGrath reported that Governor Vanderbilt had privately hired Bielaski to do the tapping and had paid the detective some \$11,000 for his efforts.

POLITICAL wiretapping is also practiced occasionally on the local level. In 1949, Clendenin Ryan, the wealthy self-appointed New York reformer, hired John ("Steve") Broady's detective agency to get what dirt it could on Mayor William O'Dwyer of New York. Broady, in turn, promptly hired the professional wiretappers Kenneth Ryan and Robert La Borde. Hidden microphones, or "bugs," were installed in the homes of Fire Commissioner James Moran and other city officials, and a mountain of information was collected. Then came retribution.

Police raided Kenneth Ryan's home, confiscated an estimated ten thousand dollars' worth of wiretap equipment, and found a list of dozens of city officials whose lines were to be tapped. Kenneth Ryan was taken to City Hall, where O'Dwyer personally questioned

him. Ryan finally sneaked away from the interview while the Mayor's back was turned and climbed out a ladies-room window.

In April, 1949, Kenneth Ryan and Broady were indicted for conspiracy to tap the wires of Manhattan Borough President Hugo Rogers, and Ryan was further indicted for escaping from custody. The next week, Ryan and Broady were also indicted for tapping the wires of a Brooklyn automobile company which was allegedly involved with politicians and racketeers.

About the same time, after Robert La Borde had blocked attempts to call him before a grand jury investigating the plot against O'Dwyer, he too was indicted for wiretapping—in a Brooklyn divorce case.

Kenneth Ryan insisted none of the officials on the list found in his possession had actually been tapped—because he had been arrested too soon. Police had to admit that neither Ryan, Broady, nor La Borde had ever been caught in the act of tapping city officials' wires. Eventually all went free. Soon afterward, O'Dwyer quit his post as mayor and left for Mexico, as U.S. ambassador.

(This concludes the first of The Reporter's two articles on wiretapping in the United States. The second, which will deal with Federal and police wiretapping, and the work of "lone-wolf" wiretappers, will appear in the next issue.)





Prowlers at the United Nations

The Latest Ambiguities Of Stalin, the Aging Oracle

ISAAC DEUTSCHER

ACCORDING to party statutes, a Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is supposed to meet at least once every three years. But no such meetings were held between March, 1939, and the Nineteenth Congress in Moscow this October.

What accounted for the long delay? None of the party leaders even pretended to justify the postponement, a tacit admission that a Congress is now no more than a relic of that remote past when the Bolshevik Party was democratically governed and when its leaders rendered a regular public accounting of their activities to their followers and appealed to them to settle controversial issues through free debate.

In the Stalinist era, controversies have been allowed, if at all, only within Stalin's immediate entourage; and as a rule Stalin himself settles them. All that a Congress is allowed to do is to listen to decisions that have already been reached, to acclaim them, and to stage a celebration for past successes.

In the course of the thirteen years that had elapsed since the previous Congress, there had not been many successes to celebrate and many issues of high policy had been in flux. It had been understandably difficult to convene a Congress in the early years of the war. The end of the war might have been the occasion for a Victory Congress, had it not been for all the dislocation within the U.S.S.R. By the time the domestic situation had improved, between 1948 and 1950, two crucial issues of foreign policy were unresolved. The Russian hegemony over eastern Europe, recently threat-

ened by Tito's defection, still had to be consolidated, and the Chinese revolution, presenting vast new problems as well as vast new opportunities, was not over.

Only this year did the domestic and foreign situations reach a point that gave the leaders confidence to stage a Party Congress.

New Faces

Nothing provides a more striking commentary on the present state of Soviet affairs than a comparison between this Congress and its predecessor.

In March, 1939, Russia was still in a state of shock after the great purges in which most of the Bolshevik Old Guard had perished. The delegates to the Eighteenth Congress that year were told that the purges had come to an end, that many innocent people had suffered, and that the party leadership was determined to put an end to the hysteria of mass denunciation.

As a token of the new "liberal" era, Beria had just replaced Yezhov as chief of the political police. And yet neither Russia nor the outside world were convinced that the convulsion was really at an end. Was it possible that Stalin could stop the purges as easily as he had started them? Could he himself escape vengeance?

Thirteen years later it is clear that no avenger has risen from the ashes of the Bolshevik Old Guard, and Stalin's rule is now consolidated. Although it is still doubtful whether Stalinism can survive its author, there exists at present no political force in Russia capable of challenging it.

In 1939, the Stalinists of the older generation who had taken part in the Revolution of 1917 still dominated the Congress. Among the twelve hundred delegates to this year's Congress, only twelve or thirteen were members of the party in 1917. Only seven per cent of the delegates had even joined the party before the end of the Revolution in 1920. More than two-thirds of them had entered politics only after Stalin had eliminated all of his rivals. This new Stalinist generation has now been elected to the controlling organs of the party, the Central Committee, the Presidium, and the Secretariat.

This generation has, of course, no recollection of the great problems, aspirations, and scruples which troubled early Bolshevism. The younger men have none of the weaknesses and none of the grandeur of early Bolshevism. Even the long cherished name, "Bolshevik," which made its appearance in Russian politics exactly forty-nine years ago, has been discarded.

AND YET the young Stalinist guard has witnessed a partial self-repudiation of Stalinism. The Congress of 1939 marked the apogee of "socialism in one country." In the name of that doctrine, his principal contribution to Communist doctrine, Stalin then openly dissociated himself from the traditional Marxist conception of the socialist state. "Engels's general formula about the destiny of the socialist state," he told the Eighteenth Congress, "cannot apply to . . . the victory of socialism in one country."

At the recent Congress, however,

"socialism in one country" was not mentioned even once. This central dogma of Stalinism had simply been deleted from the party liturgies. Stalin, Malenkov, and other leaders spoke instead about the end of the isolation of the Soviet Union, about "one third of mankind united in the struggle against capitalism," and about the new "shock-brigades" of Communism that had joined the Russian party.

The highlight of the 1939 Congress was the memorable speech in which Stalin gave the first public hint that he would be willing to make an arrangement with Hitler if the western powers spurned an alliance with Russia. The British and French governments missed the significance of the hint, but Hitler did not: A few months later Ribbentrop was in the Kremlin.

At the recent Congress Stalin kept silent except for a brief address at the closing session to the representatives of foreign Communist Parties, who were assembled in the box for distinguished guests. Throughout most of the debates he sat on the platform, expressionless and inscrutable, not a man of flesh and blood any more, but a monument to himself, a deity to which every speaker piously bowed many times, an object of interminable, vociferous ceremonies of worship.

Stalin, for the first time, did not bother to manage the Congress. He left that job to Malenkov, the appointed leader of the new generation, who presented the chief report of the Central

Committee. It was as if Stalin had deliberately staged a kind of public resignation of the old leaders. Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kaganovich, the pillars of his Politburo, were allowed to perform only short ceremonial functions, such as opening and closing the Congress; and such heroes of the preceding era as Andreyev and Budenny were even less conspicuous.

Younger men stepped into the lime-light to accustom the party and the country at large to their unfamiliar names, faces, and voices. Andrianov, Aristov, Saburov, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Patolichev, Pegov, and Puzanov were the stars. They monopolized the platform. They were promoted to the Presidium, the body that has taken the place of the Politburo. Nearly all of them had been more or less unknown before the Congress. That Stalin so ostentatiously pushed them to the fore indicates how seriously he is preoccupied with the succession, not only to himself but to his whole team.

And a New Party Line

Stalin's own self-effacement at the Congress, however, was hardly more than a stage effect. Just before the Congress met, he published an article in the *Bolshevik* and a series of letters to various Soviet theorists. He had written the article many months earlier—it is dated February 1, 1952—but he published it just on the eve of the Congress in order to provide a keynote for the debates that were to follow. Any ac-

count of the political significance of the Congress must begin with an interpretation of Stalin's article.

Oddly, the occasion for the pronouncement was a discussion among Soviet economists over the project of a new textbook on political economy. Stalin drew his conclusions from that discussion. His main theme was whether or how the "law of value," as Karl Marx formulated it, operates under socialism or its higher stage, communism. To non-Marxists the article seems as abstruse as a papal bull on some finer point of theology seems to agnostics, although Stalin did have something specific to say on domestic policies and he indicated some important long-term developments, especially in rural policy. But of greater interest to the outsider are the remarks on the international situation which Stalin inserted almost casually into his "theoretical" treatise. It was primarily for the sake of these latter remarks that the piece was published.

The foreign-policy statements are contained in two sub-chapters, one dealing with the "disintegration of a single world market" and the other with the "inevitability of wars between capitalist countries." These sub-chapters, singular in both content and style, bristle with the incongruities that are characteristic of Stalin's prose. But it would be a mistake to overlook their political significance.

He begins with the statement that the most important economic result



Malenkov and Stalin: improbable eaglet, elderly bird of prey

of the Second World War was 'the disintegration of a single all-embracing world market.' Many Communists reading this rather belated announcement must have rubbed their eyes with incredulity. Long before the Second World War, all the party economists, headed by Professor Varga, had dwelt on the decomposition of the world market. Soviet Russia had been outside the circuit of world trade ever since the Revolution. In the period of the

assertion: Referring to himself in the third person, he declared that "the well-known thesis of Stalin about the relative stability of markets in the period of the general crisis of capitalism" had become outdated. This was an unexpected echo of an inner party controversy that had taken place almost a quarter of a century before. In the middle 1920's Stalin had indeed spoken of the "relative stabilization of world capitalism," using this as the

shadows all possible conflicts within the West; that the United States would be able to use its economic and military preponderance effectively to keep the West united against Communism; and that the most intelligent spokesmen of western capitalism knew that they could not afford any internecine struggle, because nothing less than their whole social system was at stake.

This view, Stalin declared, took account only of "the surface of events." He himself was emphatically of the opinion that "wars between the capitalist countries are still inevitable," precisely because of the instability of capitalist economies. In theory, he admitted, it was true that the conflicts between capitalism and Communism went deeper than any antagonisms among the capitalist powers. This was true in theory even before the Second World War. But that war was not a crusade of a united capitalist world against Communist Russia; it had started as an internal struggle of the capitalist world. He suggested that the Third World War, if it comes, will not be different in this respect.

Thus Stalin denied that the present polarization of power between Russia and the United States was final or likely to remain the predominant factor in international relations. He forecast something like a revolt of the west European governments (and possibly of Japan) against U.S. leadership.

This was neither mere crystal-gazing nor disinterested intellectual probing of the future. From the two views which Stalin summarized, two different tactical lines follow, although he did not define them:

If the western world is firmly and lastingly united against Russia, according to Stalin's theory, then Soviet diplomacy is left with no room for maneuver among the western powers, and the Soviets cannot hope to gain capitalist allies in a Third World War as they gained them in 1941. The whole Russian bloc would then have to shape its policies from a strictly revolutionary standpoint and consider the Third World War as the final clash between Communism and capitalism.

If it is assumed, however, that the anti-Communist unity of the West is merely "a surface phenomenon," less real than the inner rivalries in the western camp, then Soviet diplomacy should have ample room for maneu-



economic nationalism let loose by the slump of 1929-1932, the "single world market" was already a memory.

STALIN'S further statement about the emergence of "two parallel world markets" sounded even clumsier. But these two sophomoric formulas served Stalin as a pretext for his assertion that the West's economic blockade of Russia and the countries within the Soviet orbit had failed to achieve its objective. It had not disrupted the Russian economy, said Stalin; on the contrary, it had spurred it on to further intensive development; and it had also been conducive to the integration of the economies of Russia, China, and eastern Europe. This was the first time that Stalin had ever publicly spoken with such strong emphasis on the economic integration and the rapid industrialization of the vast area from the China Sea to the Elbe.

Stalin followed with another curious

major premise for his theory of socialism in one country.

Since then he himself has abandoned the idea of the stabilization of capitalism, especially after the slump of 1929. Why then did he raise the issue again? Because, he went on to say, "some countries are of the opinion that in view of the new international developments . . . wars between capitalist countries are no longer inevitable."

Inevitable Capitalist War?

This was the first public intimation given the Soviet public of an important controversy that had been going on in Stalin's entourage. Stalin himself summarized the controversy quite plausibly, and what is more unusual, quite fairly, without labeling those with whom he disagreed traitors or enemies of the people.

The arguments that he set out to refute were: that the antagonism between Russia and the West over-

ver. And it should be its task as well as that of all Communist Parties to look for potential allies inside the present western bloc.

THUS, in his cryptic manner, Stalin appeared to caution Communists that they should not commit themselves irrevocably to revolutionary tactics and that they should not give up the search for bourgeois allies. The long heralded and now approaching economic slump in the capitalist countries, he said in effect, should ease their task. Under present international alignments, he suggested, his followers ought to concentrate all their efforts on splitting the Atlantic bloc. He hinted that over the years another alignment might develop, broadly similar to that which had been formed in the last war. This could be brought about by the renascence of German and/or Japanese military power. It would be wrong, he argued, to rule this out. After the First World War German military recovery had also seemed impossible. Yet it took place, and reversed the postwar alignment, which had also been directed primarily against Soviet Russia.

If the search for capitalist allies is not hopeless, then the Soviet bloc and the Communist Parties in the West must be prepared to attract potential allies by ideological concessions. "The contemporary movement for peace," Stalin pointed out, "strives to rally popular masses for the struggle for preservation of peace and prevention of another world war. Consequently, it does not pursue the aim of overthrowing capitalism and establishing socialism—it limits itself to the democratic objectives of a struggle for peace. In this respect the contemporary movement . . . differs from that which during the First World War had worked to transform imperialist war into civil war . . ."

This was exactly the formula on which the Popular Fronts of the late 1930's were based. Stalin's words so far sound like a cautious signal for the revival of Popular Front tactics.

Stalin Disagrees with Stalin

Yet Stalin himself betrays his own uncertainty about this search for bourgeois allies. In his speech at the closing session of the Congress, he himself virtually dismissed his own prognostication about the revolt of bourgeois

France and England, or bourgeois Germany and Japan, against American leadership.

"In the past," he said, "the bourgeoisie led the nation, defended the rights and independence of the nation. . . . Now not a trace is left of the 'national principle.' The bourgeoisie is selling out national rights and independence for dollars. The banner of national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. There can be no doubt that you representatives of Communist and democratic parties have to raise this banner and carry it forward. . . ."

This amounted to saying that none of the bourgeois governments could be counted upon to break away from the Atlantic bloc. Stalin did not even try to square this with his earlier statement that war between the capitalist nations was "inevitable."

In his elusiveness and apparent lack of concern over his own contradictions, Stalin has remained true to himself. Similarly, he did not try to reconcile his call for an anti-Nazi alliance in 1939 with his intimation of readiness to come to terms with Hitler. Now as then he prefers to keep all his irons in the fire. He banks on the breakdown of the Atlantic bloc and on Popular Fronts (under the banner of "national sovereignty") in France, Italy, and other European countries. At the same time, he reckons with the solidity of the Atlantic alliance and with the possibility that the Communist Parties might fail


to reconstitute Popular Fronts on an anti-American basis.

The controversy in his entourage, which he had set out to resolve, remains unresolved after all. The Congress seems to have taken Stalin's utterance about "the inevitability of wars between the capitalist nations" with a grain of salt. None of the speakers questioned it, of course, but very few quoted it with the zealous approval that is customary. Most of them seemed anxious to tone it down discreetly and merely to suggest, with reserve and realism, that friction and discord within the Atlantic bloc might delay the build-up of Atlantic power and give the Russian bloc needed time.

THE NEWS from the West which reached Moscow while the Congress was in session seemed up to a point to justify hope in these traditional diversionary tactics, and the spirits of the delegates rose accordingly. Much comment was devoted, for instance, to Britain's exclusion from the defense arrangements between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. This was interpreted as just another stage in the process by which the United States "expropriated Britain of its Empire." Malenkov made the most of it: "English propaganda alleges," he said, "that the Communists destroy the British Empire. But the ruling circles of the British Empire cannot be blind to the obvious fact that not Communists but American multi-millionaires grab British imperial possessions."

A real bombshell, and a most welcome one for Moscow, was the news that French Prime Minister Pinay had rejected an American "note" on the financing of French rearmament. Then came the reports that Herriot and Daladier had, with Pinay's approval, denounced as unconstitutional the Bonn contractual agreements. France's reluctance to give final acceptance, under American auspices, to military partnership with Germany was hailed as the confirmation of Stalin's words about the incipient revolt against the Atlantic bloc.

Stalin is not altogether a fool. Behind the scenes his diplomacy is engaged in an effort to break through the chain of the Atlantic alliance at its weakest link. The weakest link right now seems to be France.



The Case

Of the Missing Diplomats—II

CYRIL CONNOLLY

On May 26, 1951, Guy Francis de Moncy Burgess, on leave from the British Foreign Office after having been recalled from the British Embassy in Washington, and Donald Maclean, then in charge of the American Division of the Foreign Office, debarked from a Channel steamer at St.-Malo, France. There they hired a car, which they drove to Rennes. Their subsequent whereabouts are unknown, and there has been some speculation that they may have gone to a Communist country.

This is the second of two articles; the first appeared in our preceding issue.

ONE DAY toward the end of 1950, Donald Maclean invited me to lunch at his club and talked at length about the war in Korea. His argument was that what mattered most in the world was people. The Koreans were people, but in the state that the war had reached both sides had entirely forgotten this, and were exploiting the Koreans for their own prestige. It was essential, he believed, to stop the war at all costs and get the Koreans established as people again.


This was not the orthodox Communist view, according to which only the North Koreans are people and the South Koreans (as Maclean's friend Guy Burgess maintained) had really started the war. Maclean went on to suggest that all colonial possessions in the Far East were morally untenable, and when I pleaded that we should be allowed to keep Hong Kong and Malaya for their dollar-earning capacities, he said that that was precisely the reason why we should give them up, as only then could we prove ourselves in earnest and lay the basis of future good relations.

We talked for a little about how he

felt about being back at work after his breakdown, and he told me how fond he was of his colleagues, how secure and womblike the Foreign Office seemed, and how well he had been treated. I mentioned that I had at one time been intended for the Diplomatic Service and that I had always regarded it since with some of the wistfulness which he felt for literature. We left the club rather late, and he merged on the steps into a pin-striped shoal of hurrying officials, who welcomed him affectionately.

At the end of that winter a friend stopped in for a drink one evening and said that he was in difficulty: He had been up very late with Maclean the night before, and Maclean had said to him, "What would you do if I told you I was a Communist agent?"

"I don't know," the friend answered.



"Well, wouldn't you report me?"

"I don't know. Who to?"

"Well, I am. Go on, report me."

Our mutual friend had wakened the next day with a confused feeling that something unpleasant lay before him. It was an absurd situation, for it was impossible to be sure that Maclean was serious. The friend knew him so well that he could not believe it was true. The whole incident seemed preposterous in the light of day.

In August, 1950, Guy Burgess had been posted to the Washington Embassy as Second Secretary; he had last visited Washington in 1942. By the early spring of 1951 things were not going well for him. The telegrams which he drafted were often rejected as being biased; there seemed nothing for him to do; he was not popular with his colleagues; he was drinking heavily again, and during a single day, February 28, he had been stopped three times for speeding, which led to an official complaint.

Then he gave a lift to a young man and let him take the wheel. There was an accident, and it turned out that the young man had no driver's license. Burgess pleaded diplomatic immunity. At about the same time an English visitor to the Embassy reported him for anti-British talk. He was recalled from Washington as "generally unsuitable" and arrived home on the *Queen Mary* May 4.

A FEW days later I ran into him in the street. He came up with his usual snarling-playful manner and said he was just in from America.

"Where were you?"

"Washington."

"What was it like?"

"Absolutely frightful."

"Why?"

"Because of McCarthy." I thought he had said MacArthur, and asked what the general had to do with it.

"Senator McCarthy," said Burgess. "Terrible atmosphere. All these purges."

He seemed very well and almost jaunty, obviously pleased to be back. He went around saying he was convinced that America had gone mad and was determined on war.

During the winter Donald Maclean

had made a great effort to fit into his new existence as a commuter. Mrs. Maclean was expecting another child, and Donald conscientiously refused to miss his evening trains to Kent. By May, however, he seemed to be more about London of an evening, and it would be interesting if we could discover if there was any sudden increase in these outings after the return of Guy Burgess. On one occasion in April, after a heated exchange, Maclean knocked down one of his greatest friends for taking the side of Whitaker Chambers in the Hiss case. Chambers, according to Maclean, was a double-faced exhibitionist too revolting to be defended by anyone.

Maclean's drinking followed an established routine. The charming and amiable self was gradually left behind, and the hand which patted his friend on the back became a flail. A change would come into his voice like the roll of drums before the main event in a cabaret. It took the form of an outburst of indignation, often directed against himself, in which the embittered idealist would abandon all compromise and castigate all forms of humbug and pretense. As the last train left for Sevenoaks from faraway Charing Cross he would wave a large hand to his companions in some bar. "Well, anyhow, you're all right." The elected smiled happily, but doubt was spreading like a frown on Caligula. "Wait—I'm not sure. Perhaps you aren't all right. After all, you said this and this. In fact, you're very wrong. You won't do at all. And as for you—you're the worst of the lot." By this time his fists would be flying.

After a dinner party on May 15, six of us came back to my house: It was divided into two, and Maclean occasionally spent the night in the other flat. Past midnight there was a battering on the door and I let him in. He had passed through drunkenness into a disturbing soberness, the first time I had seen him in this legendary condition. He began to wander round the room, blinking at the guests as he divided the sheep from the goats, and then went out to lie down to sleep in the hall, stretched out on the stone floor under his overcoat. The departing guests had to make their way over him, and I noticed that, although in apparent coma, he would raise his long stiff leg like a drawbridge when one of



the goats was trying to pass. I put him to bed in the other flat and gave him a liquid breakfast in the morning.

Day of Departure

On May 25, the day when Burgess and Maclean left England, I met some friends on the street, and Maclean was with them, looking rather creased and yellow, casual but diffident. We all stood on the pavement. I said to him, "You're Cyril Connolly, aren't you?—I'm Sir Donald Maclean." Sir Donald, whom we had discussed during lunch at Maclean's club, was his idealized vision of himself as the model British diplomat. Maclean took the reference genially and went off gaily to lunch with his friends, who were to rejoin me for coffee.

At lunch, they told me when they came back, he had been mellow and confidential; he had talked about himself, about how much better he felt, how he didn't have to visit his psychoanalyst so often any more, and how he was determined to take hold of himself lest he get into any trouble that might bring disgrace upon his children.

That day was his birthday. The lunch was his treat, and the next week he was to be given some time off because his wife would be going to the hospital to have her baby; he asked if he could come down and visit my friends for some part of the time.

After spending that afternoon in his office, Maclean went off to Charing Cross and caught his usual train to

Sevenoaks. That evening Burgess arrived at Maclean's house—he had driven down in a rented car—and was introduced to Mrs. Maclean as "Ronald Styles." Burgess had engaged the car by telephone at about two o'clock and then gone round, paid the deposit, and undergone a brief driving test. At 5:30 he had received a long telephone call at his flat.

After a quiet and rather sober dinner Donald and "Ronald" walked in the garden. Donald then said that they had to go to see a friend who lived nearby and that he might have to stay away for the night. He promised that he would return on the morrow and took only his briefcase with him.

The pair got into the rented car and drove to Southampton just in time to reach the cross-Channel vessel *Falaise*, which left at midnight on a special weekend cruise to St.-Malo and back by the Channel Islands, returning early on Monday morning. "What about the car?" a port garage attendant yelled after them. "Back on Monday," Burgess shouted.

Burgess had reserved the two-berth cabin in his own name and had first invited a young American whom he had introduced to various people as "Miller," and whom he had met on the *Queen Mary* when returning from Washington, to accompany him. But at the last moment he did not make good on that invitation.

At St.-Malo, where the boat arrived at 10 A.M. on May 26, Burgess and Maclean stayed on board, breakfasting and drinking beer until the others had left. Then at eleven they too went ashore, leaving behind Burgess's two suitcases. At the station, where the Paris express had just left (they would have had plenty of time to catch it) they took a taxi to Rennes, the junction some fifty miles away. They did not speak on the way. They gave no tip to the driver on the fare of 4,500 francs and they arrived at Rennes station in time to catch the express again. They were not noticed on the train, which reached Paris, via Le Mans, between five and six. From that moment they have vanished.

WHEN Burgess had reserved the tickets he had said that the other name for the cabin would probably be Miller; and on the night before his departure he seemed to be in an agitated

state "looking for the friend who was going with him." He seems to have spent much of his last day in England with Miller, fetching him from the Green Park Hotel in the morning and lunching with him. At two o'clock he telephoned from his club for the car, visited the garage with Miller, parked the car near his New Bond Street flat, and went shopping to buy a white raincoat (he had no raincoat), a fiber suitcase, and a good many nylon shirts which did not fit him.

At 5:25 he left Miller at his hotel, saying, "See you at 7:30." He then went back to his flat to receive his long telephone call and packed into two suitcases and a briefcase four suits, his shirts, blue jeans, socks, handkerchiefs, and his gaudy collection of ties—an extensive wardrobe for two nights at sea. At seven he had a last drink at his club. Later that evening the American rang up the flat to know why he had not been called for.

Maclean's day was apparently quite inactive. Burgess was active, Maclean passive, and there is nothing to show that Maclean intended going anywhere until he was driven off from his house by Burgess. His birthday lunch lasted from 12:30 until after 2:30—champagne and oysters at one restaurant, then some more solid food at another; he was at work until 5:30 and he went home by his usual train. But it may be that the telephone call which Burgess received at 5:30 was some kind of SOS from Maclean.

During May, Burgess had had his worries, but he had been offered an important job on a newspaper and he had a dinner date, which he never canceled, to clinch the job on the same evening he vanished. Speaking of the new job, he had confided to a friend that at last he would be able to settle down to his great task, the addition of a final volume to Lady Gwendolen Cecil's biography of the Tory Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, which he thought the best biography in English.

Two weeks later, on June 7, as the hue and cry over the disappearance began in the press, three telegrams arrived: one from Guy Burgess to his mother in which he said he was embarking on a long Mediterranean holiday, and two from Maclean to his mother and his wife. To Lady Maclean he sent a brief message which he signed with a childhood name; to his wife he



wrote: "Had to leave unexpectedly, terribly sorry. Am quite well now. Don't worry darling, I love you. Please don't stop loving me. Donald."

A Search for Motives

Having acquired a little more background, let us examine some of the theories with which we began. It will be noticed even now how very few facts we have. We suspect that Burgess and Maclean were Communists at Cambridge, but we do not know even if they ever met after Cambridge. Both were neurotic personalities with schizophrenic characteristics. In their most recent jobs both had behaved so recklessly that they had been sent home. Both drank too much and then became violent and abusive; both might be described as abnormal; both allegedly made confessions (many years apart) of being Communist agents; and both were notorious among their colleagues for their anti-British arguments, their bitterness against "authoritarianism" and "imperialism." Both had risen fast under wartime conditions and had maintained an undergraduate-like informality in their appearance and habits and in the general casualness of their ways of life. Both had two enemies—adolescence and alcohol. When the pair vanished, each was thought by his friends to have led the other astray.

They had everything in common, in fact, except each other; they were like two similar triangles suddenly superimposed. Then how was their associa-

tion kept secret? I think myself that they must have renewed their Cambridge friendship in the summer of 1950, during Maclean's convalescence, and that Burgess was part of what Maclean called his "ashcan life," of which he was ashamed and trying to cure himself. Hence the secrecy. Were they Communist agents? Surely the first duty of a secret agent is to escape detection, express conventional views, and rise in his career. The more Communism they talked the less likely they were to be agents. And Burgess talked a great deal.

Like most people who feel they have been starved of love, Burgess and Maclean desired to raise the emotional temperature around them to something higher than in the world outside, and found in drink a consolation. If we believe that emotional maladjustment was the key to their personalities, it is hard to see how they could possess the control to serve a foreign country coolly and ruthlessly for twenty years and yet work all the time in executive capacities for their own.

SO MANY explanations of their disappearance have been put forward that it is best to deal with a few of them like chess openings. Let us first take one based on the theory of a voluntary escape.

1. *The act was nonpolitical: The two disappeared in an alcoholic haze, to wander about like Verlaine and Rimbaud and to start a new life.*

This fits in with Donald's character. He is said to have disappeared once from a party for a few days in Switzerland and to have been found living quietly in the next village. Again, he once remarked to a friend that he wished he could start a new life as a docker in the East End, but that ration books and identity cards now made it impossible. Burgess also had a reputation for disappearing, but there would be much less reason for him to give up the kind of existence to which he was addicted. Neither could have lasting attraction for the other, for the force which united them would also drive them apart, and the wanderers would certainly have been heard of again, for wherever they were in company incidents would be bound to arise; and the element of antisocial aggression in such a flight would have caused them to leave some kind of statement.

Next let us examine theories that imply that the action was forced upon them.

2. (a) "*A twitch upon the thread.*" The argument is that Burgess and Maclean were both Communist agents, Maclean (or both) was growing indiscreet and unreliable, and that they were recalled before one (or both) could give away others who were more secret and more important; that they were immediately imprisoned or liquored and may have got no farther than an uncertain address in Paris. If they had refused to go, they would have been exposed to the British and brought disgrace on their families. Even so, it is doubtful if experienced diplomats aged thirty-eight and forty would sign their own death warrants without a murmur or a farewell.

(b) *They both (or Maclean alone) had given information to the Russians at some time, perhaps on one occasion only, and this was preying on Donald's conscience.* If the information was given in Washington, it might have

been valuable, and the leak would have taken a long time to trace. Burgess might have had wind of this investigation in Washington, and even got himself sent home in order to warn Maclean. Burgess might perhaps at one time have been a kind of private commissar to Maclean. After his care-free lunch, then, on that last Friday, Maclean was somehow tipped off that exposure was imminent. At 5:30 he telephoned to his contact, Burgess, who said: "Leave it all to me."

THIS theory bristles with difficulties, but it does at least explain the sudden departure. And yet, like all who knew him, I am convinced that Maclean was not an active Communist. He had a morbid inclination to suicide, and he would say that only his love for his children kept him from it. This love was the one emotion which he felt without ambivalence, and he would not have taken any drastic step unless he had been convinced that it was for the best as far as their happiness was

concerned. Guy Burgess always enjoyed being himself, and for a while he lived his own dream, a realistic example of the "new type of diplomat" who is always demanded in wartime. But Donald Maclean, were it not for his lack of balance and emotional security, had the qualities of a great public servant.

They Are Everywhere

Meanwhile a myth is slowly transfiguring them. At first they were seen in Montmartre and Montparnasse, in Brussels and Bayonne, on the high pass to Andorra, in a bar in Cannes, and with brimming glasses in a garden-restaurant of Prague.

This year they have been heard of playing chess in the Lubianka prison and running an import-export business in Prague, and Guy Burgess as visiting Browning's villa northeast of Venice. And so for many years they will be seen, until the mystery is solved (if it ever is), haunting the Old World's pleasure traps around the season of their disappearance.

What Two-Party System in the South?

DOUGLASS CATER

A TRAVELER in Dixie nowadays could easily get the impression that the birth of a two-party system is not far off, and that the loud noises from that region during the recent campaign herald its imminent arrival. Everyone he meets will solemnly agree that a two-party system will be a very good thing for the South when it finally does come.


But here he runs into difficulty. Though many are willing to praise such a system in theory, woefully few politicians are willing to make the break and stake their future with a second party. There is no conclusive evidence that the widespread bolt to Eisenhower undermined the basic grip the one-party system has on the region. A Southern editor, surveying the post-election situ-

ation, complained of those whom he aptly described as the "drinking Drys"—those Southern Democrats who are happy to go on a Republican binge, who think Republican, who even vote for the Republican Presidential candidate at certain critical times, but who swear eternal fealty to "the Democratic Party of the sovereign state of _____." He was inveighing against the same type of hypocrisy that someone, reputedly Will Rogers, poked fun at when he said, "Mississippians will vote for Prohibition as long as they can stagger to the polls."

OF THE delegates to the Southern Governors' Conference, which met in New Orleans during the latter part of November, three—Shivers of

Texas, Kennon of Louisiana, and Byrnes of South Carolina—had given immeasurable aid and comfort to the Republican ticket earlier in the month. Yet persistent prodding from the reporters disclosed not a single governor who didn't profess loyalty to the principles of Jeffersonian Democracy—none, that is, except the ebullient Theodore McKeldin of Maryland, who officially bears the tag "Republican" and who wandered around dropping broad hints about what General Eisenhower was going to do for the South.

The three governors who had bolted their party probably did more talking



than all the rest combined. Governor Kennon explained that it was the party that had left him. Four years from now, given a decent candidate and platform, he said, Louisiana will go overwhelmingly Democratic once more. Governor Shivers stated flatly that the recent election, far from putting a second party in business in the South, portended a new era of one-party solidarity. He maintained that a conservative alignment of Southern and Midwestern Democratic leaders to recapture the party from the "pinkos" and "big-city bosses" and restore it to its true ways—of thirty years ago—would do just that.

How much flesh and muscle has the Republican Party in the South put on during recent months and how much quick fat? A survey of several of the Southern states indicates that the Republican effort was mostly an all-or-nothing gamble for the General, often to the detriment of the lasting interests of state G.O.P. groups.

Governor Herman Talmadge put a constitutional amendment on the ballot to extend Georgia's notorious county-unit system to the general election. This system, setting up block voting by counties and scaled so as to permit any three rural counties to cancel out Atlanta's large urban vote, has been for some years the instrument of Talmadge's domination over the Democratic primary. By extending it to the general election, Talmadge hoped to kill for all time the hope of effective political competition in Georgia. Republican Party leaders there privately admitted the threat posed by the amendment but declined to take an open stand for fear of arousing Talmadge's ire and thus losing the Ike supporters among Talmadge followers. It remained for anti-Talmadge Democrats to defeat this amendment.

In Louisiana, Republican leader John Minor Wisdom worked to keep Republicans from campaigning against Democratic Congressmen who were inclined to soft-pedal the Stevenson ticket. When a contestant for the seat held by Congressman Hébert refused to be dissuaded, the Republican organization simply ignored him.

Measured in terms of popular votes for their Presidential candidate, the Republican efforts had considerable success. In the eleven states of the "Solid" South, General Eisenhower re-

ceived slightly over forty-eight per cent of the votes. This is nearly 1.5 per cent greater than the Republican percentage in 1928, the last comparable period of Southern protest. In electoral votes, the gain over 1928 is not so impressive. This time, the Republicans received fifty-seven votes—or 44.5 per cent of the total—from the eleven states. In 1928, the Republicans captured sixty-two, or over forty-nine per cent.


Compared to 1928, the Republican effort in the Congressional races fell short. Only thirty Republican candidates stood for House seats in 106 possible contests; in 1928, there were forty-five candidates in 104. Six candidates won office this year compared to seven in 1928. Two were holdovers from traditional Republican territory in eastern Tennessee; one, in North Carolina, beat out a Democrat more on what appeared to be grounds of competency than of party affiliation. Only in Virginia, where three Repub-

licans were elected to Congress, did the Eisenhower sweep seem to have any drawing power in the Congressional contests. Even there, one Republican recaptured a district that had been held off and on by Republicans since Civil War days; a second Republican squeaked through in opposition to a Democrat who had beaten the Byrd machine candidate in the primary and so had little organization support.

Sad Memories

The Republican fight for state offices in the South was almost nonexistent. For example, in Tennessee—which went for Eisenhower—the Democratic candidate for governor won by a greater margin than any gubernatorial candidate in Tennessee's history.

The comparison with the election of 1928 brings quick protest from Southern Republican leaders. Then, they argue, it was strictly a regional revolt against the Catholic, anti-Prohi-



bitionist Al Smith. It came at the end of a long Republican era. This time the South's revolt was more in conformity with the rest of the nation's. And, they add hopefully, who knows but what Eisenhower has ushered in a new Republican era?

Reasonably or not, the memory of 1928 was sufficient to throw a chill into the great mass of Democratic politicians in the South. Only a handful besides the three maverick governors and Senator-elect Price Daniels of Texas came out openly for Eisenhower. The rest chose the path of loyalty or of silence. Even Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia refused to go the whole way in his repudiation of the Democratic ticket. Perhaps he remembered how a younger Harry Byrd had chastised all those Hoover-Democrats who had bolted in 1928. In Virginia, as throughout the South, few of those bolters ever won public office again.

BUT THERE is something more than mere fear of retaliation that keeps Democrats from joining the Republican Party and building it into a solid organization capable of fighting on the state as well as the national level. That something is the durability of the one-party system rooted in tradition and jealously defended by the ruling oligarchy of the South. Restrictive registration laws, tricky primary requirements, and other legal obstructions play a part in discriminating against the Republican Party. But, more fundamentally, they militate not so much against the Republican Party as against a genuinely competitive election system.

Within the limitations of its restrictive franchise, the one-party system offers a rough-and-ready sort of competition. It has even provided a measure of elasticity—an element of chance through which the man of independent mind may win office occasionally against the wishes of the dominant political faction. In the main, however, such upsets are based on personality more than on issues.

The one-party system has provided a bastion against the encroachment of the Negro voter—a fact that continues to be of major importance to white Southerners in the rural areas. One Alabamian told me that if there were two parties competing for the Negro vote, fourteen counties in which Ne-

groes outnumber whites would have Negro sheriffs, Negro prosecutors, and Negro tax assessors.

NEW-FOUND Southern Republicans, such as Grover C. Hall, Jr., of the *Montgomery Advertiser*, try to answer this by arguing that the roles of the two parties have been reversed. "The same reason that made grandpa a Democrat would make grandson a Republican," Hall editorialized last month. "That has got to be driven home to all Alabamians to dispel the black magic of the Democratic label." But this argument misses the point so far as the white Southerner, living in a county predominantly populated by Negroes, is concerned. It is not the label but the system which makes the difference to him. He knows that the one-party system has been successful so far in limiting the franchise. He believes that a two-party system would inevitably break down the barriers that now keep Negroes from voting in great numbers.

Result: No Contest


By and large, neither the Old Guard Republicans in the South nor those Democrats who voted for Eisenhower this fall want to extend the franchise or, for that matter, increase the competition on state and local levels. "We've thought of running a candidate against Congressman Davis here in Atlanta," one Georgia Republican leader told me, "but I doubt if we could find a better Republican than Davis." In Montgomery, Alabama, I asked a local Eisenhower leader, a prominent lumberman, if the next step toward building a Republican Party would not be to run a good candidate for mayor. "Yes, I guess so," he replied hesitantly, "but I like our present mayor just fine."

Even in cases where there is desire for competition, waiting for a November election seems unnecessarily hazardous. In Alabama, for example, some of the financial leaders, popularly known as the "Big Mules," are eager to defeat Senator John Sparkman, the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate, when he comes up for reelection in 1954. They are unlikely to put their money on a Republican candidate. At least two potential opponents stifled their preferences for Eisenhower this year so as not to disqualify themselves in the 1954 Democratic primary.



Among those now confronted with the responsibility of building state Republican Parties the prospects appear bewildering. One state chieftain told me at length of the need for great preliminary investigation of such state matters as highway construction, the school system, welfare services, etc., before the party could seriously consider offering competition. "Some of our fellows have told the press that we would be putting up a slate of candidates in the next election," he confided, "but between you and me, they're just a little bit naive."

All this does not mean that the one-party system cannot be broken down. But a great many of the necessary pressures must come from outside the South. It will depend in part on the success with which General Eisenhower handles his Administration, particularly in regard to such policies as



tariffs, railway-freight discrimination, and monopolistic practices—policies on which even the most conservative Southern interests have run counter to traditional Republicanism.

Patronage, too, will play a part in the success or failure of the Republican efforts, though it is generally overrated as an influence. Eisenhower's major concern must be to prevent distribution of the spoils from splitting the uneasy alliance between the Old Guard Southern Republicans, mostly Taft supporters, and the new-found disciples of Ike.

Constitutional reforms could play a part, particularly reform of the Electoral College to permit splitting a state's electoral votes proportionately to the popular vote. This would give the Republican Party a reason for expending funds and energy in even the most doggedly Democratic state, such as Mississippi. The hope for such an amendment to the Constitution is about as remote as the hope for a two-party system in the South.

William S. White of the New York *Times*, writing shortly before the election, predicted that a Southern two-party system was on its way. He



described it as "a quiet revolution in which more and more the 'haves' are being arrayed against the 'have-nots' . . ." The outcome of the November election could certainly be described as the revolt of the "haves." But rather than abandoning the Democratic Party, they took a walk from it in order to reinforce their power within it. Their revolt was summed up in the single cussword "Trumanism."

So far as the Democratic Party in the South is concerned, the "haves" find

little trouble getting what they want. They have no incentive to foster a two-party system unless they can control both parties.

IT SEEMS clear that the "haves" are not prepared to abandon the party label which has been so valuable unless even greater pressures from the North shake them loose. And the "have-nots"—the Negro, the workingman, and the dirt farmer—are equally unwilling to forsake the party which they believe more closely represents their interests nationally. The two groups may crowd each other, but neither wishes to sacrifice what has been called "the vast imponderability of the Democratic label." At present, the "have-nots" are scarcely well enough organized to sustain a party of their own, no matter what label it might bear.

If, in the years ahead, a two-party system is to be established, there must be a great deal of pulling and hauling, both within and without the South. And, in contrast to what happened in the last election, it's a pretty safe bet that it will be the "have-nots" who will be obliged to do a manful share of that pulling and hauling.

Our Enlightened Self-Interest And the United Nations

A. A. BERLE, JR.

A CAMPAIGN, first to push the United Nations out of the United States, and then to pull the United States out of the United Nations, is now well developed. It is still covert—the full battery has not been unmasked. But it is clear enough that before long one bloc of American politicians will reveal its true aim of destroying the United Nations, if it can, in a burst of isolationist nationalism.

This writer, no collector of stardust in international affairs, recognizes that the public opinion which supported the United States government in organizing the United Nations was moved by

sentiment, aspiring toward a mighty dream. Appeal was made to the straining, eternal, and eternally disappointed hope of the American public that the world could be so governed as to avoid perpetual fear of war and periodic mass slaughter. Well, now it appears that the hope is not to be immediately realized. From resulting disillusionment comes a return to self-seeking nationalism, and such bitterness can be exploited by politicians. So, say the new flag-wavers, let's give up the United Nations as an impractical, un-American dream.

Cold analysis indicates that these

new isolationists may be quite as dangerous to the safety of the United States as are Communist conspirators. The case rests not on stardust but on the implacable arithmetic of present reality. Reality indicates that the American political architects of the United Nations were not the dreamers or the stargazers. Cordell Hull, their leader, was in fact, the cannier, coolest, least sentimental politician in Washington. Senator Arthur Vandenberg was a hard-headed Michigan Republican Dutchman. Their allies ranged all the way from Senator Byrd of Virginia to John Foster Dulles of

New York. Their reasoning was built on grim reality.

The controlling facts are beyond dispute:

Prior to 1918, the world outside the Western Hemisphere (blanketed by the Monroe Doctrine) was run by twelve empires. There were Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy, and three smaller nations: Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal. In the East were two moribund empires, Turkey and China, and one young empire, Japan. A few marginal countries, like Switzerland and the Scandinavian nations, survived outside the imperial system—chiefly by consent.

As long as these empires were run by sane men—that is, men who reckoned with arithmetic—they had more in common than they had in difference. They knew war advantaged no one. So, for a century after the Peace of Vienna in 1815, war, when it broke out, was promptly limited and fought only for minor, clearly defined objectives.

The twentieth century unloosed essentially irrational forces, like Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism, with romantic visions of world conquest. This led directly to the First World War. That war released still greater irrational forces, notably the perversion of Communism into a Great-Russian push to dominate the world through revolution-conquest, and a Nazi-Fascist mania in whose name Hitler made his military bid for world supremacy. The result was the Second World War. When the battle smoke of the two wars cleared away, none of the great empires emerged intact, save only Russia's. The others were destroyed or so weakened that the imperialist system had ceased to exist. This was the situation as it stood in the spring of 1945. It so stands today.

NONE of the sixty-odd nations succeeding these empires—with the single exception of the Soviet Union—is able alone to maintain its business and economic life as a going concern. This is true of the United States. Orators proclaim that the United States is the most powerful country in the world. This statement is based on figures showing the huge American "economic potential." But America, to maintain its power, must now draw on supplies far exceeding those available within the continental limits of the country. It

must have metals, and ultimately oil, from Canada, South America, and Africa. It needs tin and rubber from Bolivia and Malaya. It requires rarer metals, like nickel, chrome, manganese, cobalt, beryllium, and so forth, from all parts of the world. There are at



least twenty essential materials the cutting off of which would cripple this country in peace or war. The go-it-alone theory simply does not add up.

The United States could, no doubt, follow the Stalinist plan and start conquering an empire. At a cost of, say, three hundred thousand American lives and \$100 billion, we could seize Canada, Central and South America, the Pacific archipelagoes, and some spare chunks of the African continent. To do this would probably involve the country in a Third World War, the precise thing we do not want. Even without that, defending the empire thus created would be infinitely more costly in money (leaving morals out) and in human freedom than maintaining a co-operative alliance. For its maintenance, a standing army of at least six million would be necessary—say three years' compulsory military service for every American boy. You could finance ten Marshall Plans for half the cost of creating, let alone maintaining, that sort of empire for even a few years.

Short of this, the United States, to

be safe and well off, must work in some sort of composite of many nations besides itself. The question is not whether it moves within the framework of a league of nations. The only question is what kind of a league of nations it must be.


Taking Inventory

Elementary strategic arithmetic arrives at the same result. It is grim, but worth summarizing.

In case of a new world war, it should be kept in mind that the United States has a population of 157 millions; for realistic purposes we can perhaps assume that Canada with 14 millions will stay with us, making 171 millions. Out of these would have to be mobilized the ultimate defense force. Perhaps, though uncertainly, we might draw on the sparsely populated regions of Central and South America. The total population of the hemisphere outside the United States and Canada is approximately 150 millions. Of these a considerable proportion would be unavailable for general defense for a variety of reasons. The best we could present from this hemisphere alone would be a front of perhaps 225 million. It is settled that ten per cent is the maximum number of people that can be withdrawn for defense without a breakdown of the civilian economy. Not more than 23 million people would conceivably be available in the event of a showdown.

The Russians have 200 millions within the Soviet Union. But they also dominate huge land areas around the Russian base, notably mid-Europe and China. At a minimum, they could now draw on a total population of 800 million. This gives a manpower of reserve of from 60 to 80 million available for Soviet military effort. The greatest single lesson of the Korean War is its demonstration that the Soviet Union can organize Chinese and other Asian manpower into an effective, modern fighting army. By itself, or even in conjunction with the entire Western Hemisphere, the United States would be helplessly outnumbered if land armies ever met.

Before 1918, the isolationists argued, and they now argue again, that we had best stay behind the screen of two oceans, using our isolation as our defense, so that any war would be essentially naval. The argument had



force in 1916. The point was still arguable in 1939, when bombers had short range and the Atlantic could only be crossed by using halfway bases at Greenland or Iceland or by making the short hop from the shoulder of Brazil to the shoulder of Africa. But today a plane can take off from Europe, circle over the United States, and return to base without refueling. Tomorrow, we expect to have atomic-powered airplanes capable of almost unlimited range—and so do the Russians. We might decide not to commit our armies on the far side either of the Atlantic or the Pacific, and to pound away with airplanes based at convenient points on this side of the ocean or elsewhere. So we could. But so could the Russians. In this hideous long-range artillery duel, fought with atomic bombs (probably H-bombs), the United States might arrange not to lose the war. It could hardly arrange to win. Both sides would come out of it wounded beyond imaginable horror. But the Communists would be betting 800 million lives against the Americas' 225 million, and they are just the kind of people to reckon coldly on losing 100 million of their own people if they can kill, maim, or immobilize 100 million Americans. The result could leave them masters of the world.

If, on the other hand, America is part of a composite of nations equal to or greater than half the world, that bitter exchange would not be profitable by Communist reckoning. I respect Communist strategic thinking, little as I like it. They play to win. Unless they see ultimate victory, they do not start. As long as the non-Communist world has organization and reasonable probability of unified action—as much unified action as the United Nations developed in Korea—the Communists' arithmetic will not take them into a

general war, granted that our armament is reasonably strong.

What is true of the United States is quadruply true of the smaller countries—for example, Great Britain, France, and Japan. The net result is that we have the most powerful possible interest—and all other countries of the free world have an equal interest—in finding, maintaining, and upholding an organization which keeps us together, offering reasonable possibility of mobilization in case of war.

ENEMIES of the United Nations like E to say that the United Nations could not easily mobilize a force, that it is difficult to make the members work together, and that few countries bear as large a share of the expense and cost as does the United States. This is not true. France, in defending Indo-China, has spent proportionately more money and life than the United States has spent in the defense of Korea.

But take the matter at its worst. The United Nations is at present the only common denominator we have with all nations of the free world. In the Korean case, it did work as a means of mobilization of force. Even where troops and money were not directly contributed, the nations involved contributed their geography for strategic movement. The agreements contained in the Charter of the United Nations are a pledge to mutual defense in case of breach of the peace by anyone, including the Soviet Union. It is plain dumb to throw all this into the trash can merely because someone surmises that the structure might not stand up in case of attack. The job is to hold on to what exists, to *make* it stand up, to strengthen it in every possible way.

Actually, the defense system of the United States rests now on a series of interlocking alliances, all held together by and within the framework of the United Nations. The important ones are: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance—the defensive alliance of the American hemisphere set up by the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro in 1948; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of 1949, which now takes in Turkey and Greece as well as western Europe; the European Defense Community Agreement providing for building a European army; and the proposed Pacific Pact (United States, Australia, New Zealand, etc.). All these


pacts buttress the structure of the United Nations. Through the wisdom of Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, and Governor Harold Stassen, the famous "Article 51" of the United Nations Charter specifically authorizes such agreements for "collective self-defense."

In effect, the United Nations is a grand alliance against aggression. It is not perfect. Like every alliance that ever was or will be, it can be levered into action only with difficulty. But it is infinitely better than no alliance at all. Imagine that tomorrow morning you read in the headlines, UNITED NATIONS DISSOLVED; UNITED STATES STANDS ALONE. The mere announcement would change the entire pattern of national thinking and national life.

The Soviet View

Now let us look for a moment at the Kremlin side.

Stalin was very frank a few weeks ago in his signed essay designed to guide the most recent world conference of the Communist Parties. He expects the operation of the capitalist system to cause quarrels for markets and that



capitalist nations—that is, the nations of the free world—will fall out and go to war with each other. The Kremlin then expects to intervene and take over completely. He did not state his plans about the United Nations, but they are reasonably clear, too. He would like, sometime, to take over the United Nations. Not being able to do that now, his delegations aim at exploiting, so far as possible, differences and quarrels among the nations of the free world. But in seven years the Kremlin has been unable to open any major breach between the free-world nations, and will be unable to do so unless the free-world diplomats are guilty of almost criminal folly.

The possibility of quarrels between free-world nations is considerable; but the United Nations is at present the

greatest single agency for composing the differences. It was able to limit the incidence of the Arab-Israel war. It has been able to prevent Pakistan-Indian fighting from flaring into war over Kashmir. It can be called in should the nations of western Europe come to odds. It did unite the free world in resistance to the Communist push for South Korea. Short of a death wish or suicide complex in the western nations, it should be able to handle most of the disputes which are likely to arise among sane men. Thus far the presence of the Stalinist bloc has acted not to divide but to unite the free world within the United Nations. Stalinist strategy is inherited from Genghis Khan and, after him, Tamerlane, who specialized in cajoling one nation with false favors while attacking a neighbor nation. It is vastly harder to do this when the entire free world meets in open, friendly assembly as it does in the United Nations.

Because the United Nations includes the Soviet Union and its captive governments, its operations are a headache to American diplomats. But to Moscow, the headaches must be even greater. Russian delegations can snarl in Assembly sessions and committees but they cannot disturb the interlocking alliances noted above. Even outside the "collective-security groups" the more neutralist nations are held, through the United Nations, in working arrangements with the free western world. Pakistan, India, Burma, Siam, and Indonesia, for example, within the United Nations, steadily work for a free world to a measurable extent. Were the United Nations to break up, they would either become isolated targets or, at best, a neutral bloc. Under the United Nations Charter, an attack on any one of them might well engage the force of the entire free world. The Soviet empire knows this; so do even the "neutralist" nations; and their interests accordingly lie more with the free world than with Moscow.

In any case, from the American point of view, the United Nations—the Soviet bloc included—is preferable to the formalized split that would result if the United Nations were to break up. Then indeed the world would at best be divided into two blocs, maneuvering for position while openly awaiting the outbreak of a Third World War; at worst, the Soviets would have

an open reason in which to stalk, hunt, and seize nearby isolated countries.

From the Kremlin point of view, the United Nations as presently constituted is a pain in the neck which can neither be controlled nor broken up. All Stalin really needs is a group of Americans shortsighted enough to do his work for him. That perhaps is why there are no Communist attacks on men like Gerald L. K. Smith (Chairman of the Nationwide Committee for the Abolition of the United Nations); William Henry MacFarland, Jr. (the American Flag Committee and the Nationalist Action League); Congressman John T. Wood of Idaho, who franks out MacFarland's material; Tom Lindner, the Georgia State Commissioner of Agriculture, who sends out attacks on the United Nations; Suzanne Stevenson of the Minute Maids and Vivien Kellems of the Liberty Belles; or Frank Holman of the American Bar Association, whose extreme nationalist position has split the association. Paradoxically, the hatchetmen of the Hearst newspapers talk language which often closely parallels the Communist Party line. There is no left-wing opposition to the so-called "Bricker Amendment," whose effect would be to make American participation in the United Nations virtually inoperable.


At the moment, the campaign against the United Nations is the primary property of a lunatic fringe of the extreme Right, abetted by a few men who ought to know better, and who are constructing "front" organizations taking in groups of people who object to specific uses of the United Nations. But it is clear that the real objective of

these groups is a major political movement to end American membership in the United Nations.

From the hardest-boiled examination of the American system, this is a blueprint for disaster.

THE FOREGOING analysis left the dream of an effective peace system wholly out of account. But it can not be left out of account. Historically the millions of Americans who nourished that dream were following a sounder instinct than the spurious isolationism put forward now. In international affairs, dreams do have validity if they are accurately appraised and dealt with for what they are.

Throughout much of history, the dream of a world ordering of affairs which shall maintain peace has been a dominant ideal. In the form of the Holy Roman Empire, of which the Catholic Church was the central organizing unit, it achieved some degree of peace in an anarchic Europe for some centuries. In a later resurgence, the Concert of Europe maintained a notable peace in the days of the twelve empires. Those periods in history when no such dream found effective expression were periods of sheer, stark anarchy. This is not to idealize. It is to say that historically a peace system, however imperfect, is better than no peace system at all. A dream pursued does lead to some reality, though reality falls infinitely short of the dream. The groups that are now fighting the United Nations ought to be told, with great bluntness, that their fight injures, weakens, and endangers the United States.



Alec Guinness, ‘The Pale Young Man’

LESLEY BLANCH

AMONG THE tweeds, Austins, and Royal Doulton of Britain's export drive, British films rate high. New York audiences are particularly partial to their odd combination of matter-of-factness, mild fantasy, and pawky humor. They are at once poetic and ordinary, like life itself. Alec Guinness is the embodiment of these qualities, and, more than any other English actor, typifies the subtle flavor of British films.

The Guinness style of understatement—for he is full of style, though not in the least mannered—has impressed itself on the American public with increasing momentum. Today you are apt to hear people discuss “the new Guinness” rather than the latest British picture.

His newest film to be shown in New York is “The Promoter,” from one of Arnold Bennett’s minor novels, *The Card*. Like so many of his films, it is the saga of the little man tilting against life.

HIS SUCCESS might be attributed to the fact that he alone among contemporary actors has re-created an archetypal figure whom we recognize and follow through a series of adventures. This, it seems to me, is a deliberate return to the picaresque tradition, despite the fact that most people consider Guinness to be a chameleon actor who changes brilliantly with each role. Now while his versatility was clearly demonstrated in the gymnastic *tour de force* “Kind Hearts and Coronets,” it was not so much great acting as great charades, and he played it with exactly the one-dimensional bravura the pic-

ture required. Even in this, one of his earliest successes, he had formed his line. He was busily defining the archetype. The charade does not deceive us. We see Guinness as the Bishop, Guinness as the Duchess, Guinness as the Admiral—Guinness himself in each fresh silhouette. Already, in this picture made in 1949, he had established the supremacy of the Guinness character over mere characterization.

In so doing he shook off the dangers of classification which threatened him in such pictures as “The Lavender Hill Mob” or “The Man in the White Suit.” It would have been fatally easy for so good an actor to have given a series of excellent character studies. Instead, he understood the need for one basic character whose adventures could be followed from film to film in the classic manner of the *commedia dell’arte*, which was made up, it will be remembered, of fundamental types—Clown, Pantaloons, and Harlequin—which never trespassed beyond the limitations of their roles and were always recognized as interdependent units of a dramatic whole. Their last flowering was found in the English music halls and American burlesque houses. Chaplin was the perfect expression of this dying tradition. Charlie the little clown was always the same. We loved him, we followed him from incident to incident, we did not want him to develop or change. He had only to remain himself, within a slightly shifting environment. Today all that magic has been lost, superseded by the slicked-up cinema.

But in Alec Guinness we see the re-emergence of this tradition. In his case

it is the mild-mannered, pale young man whose unworldliness is a compound of honesty and clumsiness. He has the same innocent sucker’s smile that once was Harry Langdon’s. He is the little man whose humor and ingenuity always manage to deflate Officialdom, Pomposity, and the Boss. More credible, less stylized than Chaplin’s clown, he could pass in a crowd—an English crowd, at any rate, and preferably a Victorian one. But he is still the little man tilting against the Fates, and our hearts go out to him.

For those who have never seen Guinness on the stage, it is difficult to assess him on the screen. He has none of that dazzling tinsel quality which is the essence of the theater; he is not the stuff of Barrymore or Olivier. American audiences saw him in 1950 as the psychiatrist in T. S. Eliot’s play *The Cocktail Party*. But London audiences saw him play the Fool in Laurence Olivier’s production of “King Lear,” and there his full stature emerged, revealing that quality of tragic comedy, of heartbroken clowning which only a truly great artist achieves.

Guinness’s peaked face, so controlled and yet so sad, recalls Victor Hugo’s *L’Homme qui rit*—the man whose face had been slashed into a perpetual grin by the gypsies who deformed the child for their troupe of strolling clowns. Behind the aching perpetuity of the grin, the man lived on—only his eyes betrayed him. Sometimes, in a moment of repose, of thought, the Guinness eyes seem to look out over the smile, luminous and haunting.

From Fool to Fagin

Alec Guinness is a particularly Dickensian type. He could play almost any of that vast field of characters. He was the ingenious Herbert Pocket, “the pale young man” of “Great Expectations,” to the life. Certainly no one envisaged him as Fagin, yet his playing of this part was legendary.

When Director David Lean was casting “Oliver Twist,” he was swamped in auditions for the boy Oliver: Angel children and nasty brats were put through their paces by calculating mothers. Fagin did not seem to present a problem. There were several likely character actors lined up. Suddenly, Alec Guinness astonished everyone by demanding the part. It was very awkward, but Guinness held tenaciously to

his point and at last it was decided that he should be humored and given a test. What followed became cinema history. The pale young man, the smiling wag, was metamorphosed. Guinness appeared for the test in the extraordinary makeup which he had devised from Cruikshank's illustrations. It was as if he had animated the old Jew by some alchemical process. Cruikshank's character was there in the flesh: the snaky, greasy locks bound by the noxious bandanna, the scimitar-hooked nose, the full Oriental lips, the foxy, rheumy eyes which, like the claw hands, missed nothing. "Oliver m' dear"—the voice was insinuating yet compelling, a veiled note of menace behind the cringing. The mere apparition silenced all doubts. In this case, the archetypal Guinness vanished. We saw Fagin as Dickens created him, and as Cruikshank drew him.

Unfortunately, American audiences did not see this picture for some time; racial prejudices never intended were read into it, and it was banned. Later, during the New York run of "The Cocktail Party," when Guinness was asked what he thought of the banning, he got up quietly and left the room; it was his only comment on what he considered an unjust estimate of his faithful interpretation.

His next picture will be, from his point of view, another departure from the archetype. He does not see himself

as either a romantic or dashing figure, but he will play the part of an R.A.F. pilot during the defense of Malta; and in the heroic setting, a burning love story unfolds.

The Play Within a Play

Hamlet runs through his life and his career as a leitmotif. His first break into the London theater came in 1933. John Gielgud gave him the part of Osric, which he doubled with that of the Third Player, in Gielgud's production of *Hamlet*. The next four years were spent tearing passions to tatters, playing in stock with the three great London companies: Michel Saint-Denis', Gielgud's at the New Theater, and Tyrone Guthrie's at the Old Vic. In 1938 he was accorded the distinction of playing Hamlet himself, at the Old Vic in the modern-dress production. He attracted considerable attention. With this role, he had arrived. Returning to the theater, after spending the war years in the Royal Navy, he became an established star at once. Even so, he suffered one spectacular flop, in his production of *Hamlet* for the London Festival season in 1951. It was considered a deadly bore and was withdrawn almost at once.

He is not what is known as "a quick study," and he is without any of the actor's accepted fireworks; his tempo is even. He appears to be one of the rare artists who can maintain in his

everyday life the same rich sense of humor he shows in his work.

IN THE flesh, Guinness has something faintly forlorn yet stubborn about him. Very quiet, with a deceptive air of diffidence, he knows exactly what he wants and is not to be deflected from it, whether it is a matter of playing Hamlet in a beard or of buying a country house by practical, rather than emotional, choice. (It must have electricity, he insisted, prudently dismissing a series of romantic timbered mansions or cottages—easier to run, easier to sell, he explained, with even more prudence.) He is all undertones, as muted as the English climate: that opaque atmosphere, rather than light, which falls across Constable's meadows or Turner's seashores.

The eternal "pale young man" is now thirty-eight, fair, freckled, and balding. He is married; his wife, who was also on the stage, seldom acts now. Perhaps both of them value above the renown that might be theirs as a husband-and-wife team the calm that goes with non-competitive domesticity. They have one small, caroty-fair son, a modest car, a parrot called Percy, and a house large enough for Guinness to isolate himself in "The Room," the ominous name by which he refers to his study. They live in the rather Dickensian ambiance of a forgotten square on the outskirts of London, beyond Chelsea, beyond Hammersmith. Chiswick is a neighborhood which has always held a singular attraction for painters, writers, and actors. Hogarth, Sir Beerbohm Tree, and Lady Hamilton all lived there; today actor Michael Redgrave, author and former Parliamentarian Sir Alan (A. P.) Herbert, and Stephen Potter, the author of *Lifemanship*, have all been drawn to the quiet streets and historic little houses. It is a backwater, which the colony prefers to keep that way. Lilac and laburnum cascade over the delicate iron railings of the little gardens. Below, the river and its barges drift past.

Here then, returned to the abiding muted English scene, Alec Guinness lives a tranquil family life. He reads large numbers of biographies, and they will be stored, apparently forgotten, but may suddenly emerge at a timely moment, to build up some convincing characterization. All turns inward, to be transmuted into dramatic terms.



What Man Has Made

GOUVERNEUR PAULDING

OUR WORLD FROM THE AIR: An International Survey of Man and his Environment. By E. A. Gutkind. 400 photographs. Double-day. \$7.50.

THIS extraordinary collection of photographs, almost all taken from the air, is published under the auspices of the British Institute of Sociology; it is equipped with a foreword by Professor G. P. Gooch and an introduction by Lewis Mumford; the photographs are briefly commented upon by Professor E. A. Gutkind, who classifies them under such balanced chapter headings as "Fear and Security," "Confidence and Adjustment," "Aggressiveness and Disintegration," "Responsibility and Unification." Also, when somebody chops down some trees and makes a field where there was a forest, he is inclined to say that the process results in a "spatial extension of the man-made landscape . . . roughly identical with the *oikumene*, i.e. the living-space actually occupied by Man."

Oikumene is a nice word to know. But the point, for some of us, is that we are looking down from an airplane directly at a field in New England; we turn the page and we are looking down at a rice paddy in China; further on, there will be the fields that depend on the River Nile. All these fields differ in size and shape, according to the system of ownership and the difficulties of cultivation, but when we look down at them it is always with the same sense of recognition wherever they may be, for they are the earth as man has transformed it.

Ramparts They Watched

That is the theme of this book: what Man has done to the earth—Man, not New Englanders, Chinese, or Egyptians, or Assyrians, Aztecs, Romans, or Greeks. For in the striking evidence of these four hundred photographs, dif-

ference yields to similarity. The superficial and the picturesque are dismissed.

When you photograph an African village from the air you do not get any exotic picture of the villagers dancing one of their ritual dances, but only the circular pattern of the kraal, with provision made for enclosing the herd in a central corral and with the houses in a circle round the herd. At nightfall, our covered wagons traveling West used the same plan. It is the primitive plan for defense, and no matter how it may seem to change and develop—the castle on the hilltop, the fortified bridge, the island citadel—it is always recognizable. It reached its extreme application when it was applied to whole nations—the Great Wall of China, the Maginot and Siegfried Lines in France and Germany. The system is obsolete now: No wall can defend against the new enemy; no roof can shelter.

There have been plenty of photographs that have shown us what the last war destroyed, and in this book there are photographs of ancient buried cities, whose traces—the network of the streets, the walls—are visible only from the air because their pattern shows in lighter lines on the soil that covers them. We know well enough that civilizations have vanished, and in pictures here of Mexico and Mesopotamia we see the evidence. The first picture in the book is of the submarine

volcano of Krakatau erupting in the Sunda Strait in Indonesia; the last—already outdated in horror—is of the underwater bomb test at Bikini. Its caption, reasonable, if ponderous, asks: "Is this eruption the involuntary admission of our unpreparedness for a new beginning, or will it mark the conclusive ending of an epoch of distrust and aggressiveness?" The book does not argue the point; it supplies no answers; it shows only what there is for man to protect and save. That is what makes it a poignant document.

Things to Defend

We talk about the spiritual values of our civilization, and that is quite all right, but it is extremely useful to remember that there are simpler things we must defend. They are here in this book. They have simple names: A road, a field, a house, a city, a harbor—it may be a small harbor used only by a few fishermen. No adjective-American, Russian, German, Japanese, Chinese—need be applied to them; the pictures show what they are and no one has set any flag flying above them. They are this factory, this dam, this clover-leaf intersection, and they are also this medieval castle which is doing no one any harm, this deserted Aztec temple in which human sacrifice is no longer exacted, this monastery—it does not matter of what religion—high in the mountains with the clouds between it and the world beneath. They are the forests we are replanting, the suburban development in which provision has been made for a golf course—but they are also that little row of round, one-room huts in the province of Extremadura in Spain, huts to which shepherds return in the cold darkness of the winter night. They are what man has made; without them he cannot live.

Perhaps this book, as some of its rather special language might suggest, is intended primarily for the archaeologist, the historian, the city planner; but, as Lewis Mumford remarks, it is "a challenge to action . . . The problem of our generation is to summon up enough love and fellow feeling, for both the earth and its inhabitants, to turn every habitable part of it into a permanent home." For those of us who do not feel like accepting any particular challenge just now, *Our World From the Air* can still serve as a wonderful Christmas present.





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
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